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A CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY VALVE: THE 
VARIANCE IN ZONING AND LAND-USE BASED 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS 
Jonathan E. Cohen* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When, in late 1993, the voters of Houston rejected a proposed 
zoning ordinance for their city, it was national news.! Zoning oppo-
nents were heard to proclaim that they had struck a blow for free-
dom.2 "Houstonians in their heart want freedom. They don't want 
regulation," reported an anti-zoning activist.3 "We're the only free city 
in the country," boasted another.4 It was a clear case of the exception 
proving the rule: zoning is a nearly universal feature of land-use 
regulation in the United States.5 Doubts as to zoning's legitimacy have 
long since been transformed into general acceptance. 
But the anti-regulatory sentiments expressed by the zoning oppo-
nents in Houston no doubt strike a responsive chord in those rankled 
by environmentally based restrictions on their ability to develop land. 
The legitimacy of such requirements as sensitive area setbacks is less 
secure. Challenges to such land-use based environmental controls,6 
* Executive Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Houston Voters Again Reject Zoning, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1993, at Flo 
2 See id. 
3Id. 
4 Mike Tolson, Zoning Failsjor Third Time in Houston, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 1993, at 17G. 
5 ROBERT J. MASON, CONTESTED LANDS: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN NEW JERSEY'S 
PINE BARRENS 23 (1992). 
6 As used in this Comment, "land-use based environmental controls" refers to those laws, 
regulations, and ordinances that restrict or limit the type of use, or the physical aspects of the 
use of land, in order to preserve or enhance predominantly naturally occurring features such as 
ecosystems, wetlands, and dunes. 
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the benefits of which may be less obvious than zoning's, are likely to 
continue. 
In the wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, questions 
regarding the proper scope of government regulation of natural re-
sources have received a great deal of legal scholarly attention.7 The 
question of whether land-use regulations will be deemed a "taking" 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment has been central 
to the inquiry. As the dust has settled, a key question for land-use 
regulators has been how to protect the environment responsibly and, 
at the same time, avoid unintentionally taking a landowner's property. 
In answering this question, regulators have learned that one way to 
do so is to incorporate so-called "safety valves" into regulations.8 
These are procedures designed to prevent governmental restrictions 
from operating in such a manner that the burden on an individual 
landowner amounts to a taking. One such safety valve has been a 
feature of zoning ordinances practically since their inception early in 
this century. That device is the variance. 
The zoning variance works by empowering a local body with the 
authority to make a quasi-judicial determination with respect to the 
burden that strict application of a land-use restriction or limitation 
would impose on a landowner.9 Where, under the applicable standard, 
this burden is sufficiently severe, the body may vary the terms of the 
ordinance. That is the theory. The history of the variance in practice 
tells quite another story. Local decisionmaking bodies have been 
found frequently to base decisions to grant or deny variances on 
inappropriate and substantially irrelevant factors.lO As these variance 
decisions were challenged in court, clear rules emerged. Courts held 
that the variance-granting function was to be exercised sparingly; it 
was not a dispensing power but a safety valve. For a landowner to be 
eligible for an exception from a comprehensive zoning scheme's use 
restrictions ,11 prevailing doctrine requires a showing of a burden that 
would amount to a denial of all reasonable use of the property-the 
equivalent of a constitutional taking.12 
7 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). The Court's recent decision 
in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), will no doubt also be scrutinized. See infra 
notes 94-109 and accompanying text. 
8 Commonly suggested measures for ensuring that a restriction will not constitute a taking 
include performance standards and special permits, use of flexible standards, transferable 
development rights, amortization procedures, voluntary measures by landowners, and taxes. 
9 See infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
11 Some courts will allow deviation from area restrictions upon a lesser impact. See infra notes 
158-59, 219-30 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra section IV.B. 
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Commentators have noted that the variance, in addition to its use 
in zoning, is also an important component of environmental land-use 
regulation.l3 Given the increased awareness that a land-use restriction 
may be judged a taking, the question may arise of how a local or state 
decisionmaking body is to assess an application for a variance from an 
environmentally based land-use restriction. This Comment examines, 
and attempts to learn from, the law of the zoning variance in order to 
determine the standard that a court will apply in reviewing such a 
decision. The Comment suggests that, based on the zoning variance 
experience, courts will generally approve the grant of a variance 
where the landowner would otherwise be denied the reasonable use 
of his or her property. Courts that have considered the question 
recognize that properly enacted land-use based environmental re-
strictions, no less than-and perhaps more than-traditional zoning 
restrictions, constitute widely applicable legislative rules of substan-
tial public importance. Courts have turned to zoning caselaw and have 
begun to import some of the doctrines developed in that area. For 
agencies and others who administer environmental land-use pro-
grams, the application of zoning variance law suggests that in typical 
situations, they need only grant a variance from environmental re-
strictions upon a showing that denial would leave the owner with no 
reasonable use for the land and would be tantamount to a taking 
without compensation. This standard, and related doctrines, are 
rooted in a well-developed body of caselaw that arose under the 
traditional zoning variance. In reviewing variance decisions in envi-
ronmental land-use cases, courts have turned to this caselaw, and 
have found it both useful and applicable. 
Section II of this Comment provides a background history of fed-
eral takings analysis, highlighting those Supreme Court decisions that 
are especially pertinent for zoning and environmental land-use regu-
lation.l4 Section III outlines the current state of federal takings law, 
again focusing on land-use regulation.l5 Section IV recounts the ori-
gins, development, operation, and caselaw of the variance in the con-
text of traditional zoning.l6 Section V surveys the use of the variance 
in land-use based environmental controls such as wetland protection 
legislation and regulations.l7 The section proceeds to examine how 
courts, faced with challenges to variance decisions made in the con-
13 See infra note 250. 
14 See infra notes 20--76 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 77-149 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 150--249 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 250--83 and accompanying text. 
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text of environmental land-use controls, have reviewed the decisions, 
in particular, how they have interpreted the variance standard. Sec-
tion VI assesses the use of zoning caselaw in the environmental con-
text, and concludes that in most circumstances courts have treated 
the variance in land-use based environmental controls much as they 
have treated the zoning variance: as a narrow takings safety valve.I8 
At the same time, the principles that have been developed in the 
zoning context to justify the imposition of substantial restrictions on 
landowner freedom are found to provide strong support for proper 
environmental land-use controls.I9 A few observations are offered 
with respect to particular cases of the use, and misuse, of zoning 
variance caselaw in the review of environmental land-use variances. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
This discussion of the variance in land-use based controls such as 
environmental programs takes place against the backdrop of the Con-
stitution's "takings clause." The clause provides that if the govern-
ment takes private property for a public use, the government must 
justly compensate the person from whom it is taken.20 Throughout 
United States history, property owners have raised objections to 
government interferences with their ability to do what they want 
with their property. In this century, landowners have set up the 
takings clause in their challenges to zoning and other restrictions on 
the use of property. The role of the variance in zoning and environ-
mental land-use controls are best understood in light of the fundamen-
tal tensions between public and private rights played out in the Su-
preme Court's major land-use regulatory takings cases over the past 
century. 
In the landmark Lucas decision, Justices Scalia and Blackmun en-
gage in a debate over the proper function of the takings clause.21 As 
will be seen, their disagreement incorporates elements of a debate 
that underlies much of the history of the Supreme Court's regulatory 
takings jurisprudence. The view espoused by Justice Blackmun en-
18 See infra section V.B. 
19 This Comment does not explicitly respond to the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), by developing a theory of environmental land-use regulation 
based on traditional tort and property concepts. A number of commentators have undertaken 
this worthy task. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation."). 
21 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. at 2886-904, 2904-17 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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compasses a conception of the clause as a protection only against 
arbitrary assertions of government power. In this view, government 
has expansive powers to take actions on behalf of the public interest 
under the police or commerce powers.22 Justice Scalia's view, by con-
trast, conceives of the takings clause as the fundamental econo-con-
stitutional bulwark against government regulation of private prop-
erty. Taken to its logical extreme, this view requires that the 
government pay just compensation any time a regulation reduces 
property values.23 
A consistent unifying theory of the takings clause has thus far 
proven elusive.24 Perhaps the clause can be understood as expressing 
the idea that government actions that result in deprivations of prop-
erty should be constitutionally bound, in order to ensure that the 
individual is not called upon to bear an unduly disproportionate bur-
den in furtherance of a public good.25 In this view, the takings clause 
protects expectations rooted in custom and necessity, not in legisla-
tively manipulable positive statements of law. Reliance on such norms 
ensures that we do not fall back on a conception of rights delimited 
by legislative grant.26 Despite the current vitality of the debate, for 
the first century and a quarter of its existence, the takings clause was 
22 See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 
155-61 (1971) (arguing for broad conception of police power to regulate where "public rights" 
are involved). 
23 For the quintessential, and controversial, expression of this viewpoint, see generally RICH-
ARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
24 Some have suggested that the search is misguided. See generally Jeremy Paul, The Hidden 
Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1991). 
25 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7 (2d ed. 1988). See also 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), which is often cited for the proposition that 
the Takings Clause was designed "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." While 
Armstrong is increasingly cited in land-use contexts, see, for example, Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 
2309, 2316 (1994), the facts of the case are rarely mentioned. The case involved a taking of 
intangible legal rights-mechanics' liens on personal property-title to which had been trans-
ferred from a contractor to the federal government. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 48. The Court held 
that the liens constituted a property interest requiring compensation. [d. The Court distin-
guished between "takings," which require compensation, and "consequential" destructions of 
property, which do not. [d. The Court found a taking had occurred because before the govern-
ment action the plaintiffs had a compensable property right. [d. The government had unilater-
ally extinguished the plaintiffs' liens and was the "direct, positive, beneficiary" of the action. [d. 
Armstrong is thus in line with those later cases in which the Court would identify inviolate 
categories of intangible property rights. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
26 This has been denoted the "bitter-sweet" concept, based on Justice Rehnquist's majority 
opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy: "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined 
with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a 
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applied only to physical takings-that is, actual physical invasions of 
a landowner's property. 
A. Pre-Pennsylvania Coal: 1789-1922 
At the time of Constitutional ratification, the takings clause was 
probably envisioned as applying only to direct, physical appropriation 
of property.27 During the first half of the nineteenth century, as states 
adopted takings clauses of their own, 'most takings clause litigation 
occurred at the state level.28 Courts regularly denied compensation to 
landowners who, by force of government action, were denied the 
use-even the sole economically viable use29-of their property, and 
generally deferred to legislative prohibitions on uses.30 By mid-cen-
tury, courts established that compensation was only required for 
physical takings tantamount to a fee interest.31 
After the Civil War, as the federal judiciary became involved in the 
review of state actions under the federal Constitution, its decisions 
respected an expansive conception of state and local government's 
ability to regulate land use under the police power, even where the 
limits on a landowner's freedom were substantial. In 1887, the Su-
preme Court adhered to a limited reading of the takings clause as a 
limit on land-use regulation in Mugler v. Kansas.32 The Court held 
that when the state acts under its police power to ban a "noxious" use 
that the state deems injurious to the public health, no compensation 
is required.33 Subsequent cases followed the rationale of Mugler.34 
litigant ... must take the bitter with the sweet." 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974); see TRIBE, supra 
note 25, § 9-5, at 602 & n.19. 
27 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992). This view is 
discussed in William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985). 
28 The federal Constitution's takings clause applied only to the federal government until 1897. 
See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
29 See Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 585, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827). 
30 See Comment, Land Use RegUlation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century 
America, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 854, 855 (1973) (identifying isolated early-1800s cases in which 
compensation was paid for less than fee takings). 
31 [d. at 857. 
32 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). At issue in Mugler was a liquor prohibition that forced brew-
eries to cease operation. [d. A group of brewery owners challenged the law on an economic 
diminution theory. [d. That is, they claimed that the regulation so diminished the value of their 
property as to violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. 
33 Id. at 669. 
34 See Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1915) (upholding ordinance 
prohibiting livery stables); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409-12 (1915) (upholding 
ordinance that forced brick factory to shut down), see also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 
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A series of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century cases em-
ployed the concept of "average reciprocity of advantage" to sustain a 
range of social and economic programs under a broadening police 
power.35 Generally, these cases reflect the notion that the greater and 
more widespread the public benefit derived from a measure, the 
greater the private burden that will be tolerated without a compen-
sation requirement.36 Despite some opposition and criticism,37 the Su-
preme Court employed the reciprocity concept to uphold various 
regulatory schemes that imposed a burden on individuallandowners.38 
B. Pennsylvania Coal and Euclid 
It was not until 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that the 
Supreme Court specifically found that the Constitution required di-
rect compensation to a landowner whose use of property was not 
physically taken, but rather was restricted by regulation.39 At issue 
was the state of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act,40 which required mining 
companies to leave pillars of coal in place to prevent subsidence un-
derneath structures, roads, or waterways.41 The Pennsylvania Coal 
Company had conveyed surface rights to Mahon, a landowner, but had 
reserved the mining estate, which is given special recognition under 
(1928) (upholding uncompensated destruction of infected cedar trees); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 
133,136--37 (1894) (upholding uncompensated destruction of personal property, and setting forth 
classic statement of substantive due process test). 
36 See Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: 1bward a New 
Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 304-19 (1990) (discussing evolution 
of the concept in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922), Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914), Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), and 
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885». 
36 See id. at 319; see also Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme 
Court Regulatory Takings Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of 
Advantage," and "Bundle of Rights" from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 653, 678-79 (1987) (discussing economic justification for regulations in these cases). 
37 Some criticism came from state courts. See, e.g., Hoagland v. Wurts, 41 N.J.L. 175, 177-78, 
181 (1879) (striking down marshland drainage provision), rev'd, 114 U.S. 606 (1885). 
38 Coletta, supra note 35, at 315. 
39 260 U.S. 393, 412, 415-16 (1922). The view that government action short of physical invasion 
may amount to a taking of property was not born in Pennsylvania Coal. See Hippler, supra 
note 36, at 656-80 (examining three modes of analysis in pre-Pennsylvania Coal Supreme Court 
cases). 
40 1921 Pa. Laws 1198 (May 27, 1921). 
41 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13. In fact, the Court had recently upheld a measure 
requiring coal companies to leave a pillar of coal in place along the border with adjoining mines 
in Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 540 (1914). Holmes spilled little ink distinguish-
ing Plymouth Coal, classifying the challenged requirement in that case as having been to 
protect mine employees and thus providing an average reciprocity of advantage. Pennsylvania 
Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
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state law, to itself.42 The company asserted that the Kohler Act, as 
applied to the Mahon property, deprived it of the reserved right to 
mine coal. In finding that a taking had occurred, the Court concluded 
that the Kohler Act, as applied to the property in question, sought to 
prevent only a minimal, private harm.43 Justice Holmes, speaking for 
the Court, set this purpose against "the extent of the taking" which, 
he found, was "great."44 While a diminution in the value of land is a 
necessary byproduct of governmental regulation, diminution is a fac-
tor that a court must consider in determining whether a particular 
regulation goes ''too far."45 Here, the Court concluded, the Kohler 
Act's prohibition effectively destroyed the "mining estate," and thus 
crossed the line between proper regulation and improper regulatory 
taking.46 
While the Court recognized that certain aspects of property own-
ership may be subject to governmental restrictions enacted pursuant 
to an implied police power servitude,47 Justice Brandeis's dissent truly 
adhered to this Mugler rationale. For Brandeis, deprivation of an 
economic use resulting from proper health and safety measures does 
not constitute a taking.48 The Kohler Act did not constitute an appro-
priation, but merely barred a "noxious use."49 Further, the proper 
focus for determining the Act's economic impact on Pennsylvania 
Coal, asserted Brandeis, was the property as a whole, not just the 
mining estate.50 Thus, the coal that Pennsylvania Coal was required 
to leave in place was of relatively little value.51 
42 See generally Hugh G. Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support 
and the "Third Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1951). 
43 "This is the case of a single private house." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. Holmes 
also asserted that the fact that the Kohler Act would not apply where the surface and mining 
rights are owned by the same party evidenced its linlited public purpose. Id. at 413-14. Holmes 
chided the legislature for having acquired rights of way without acquiring the necessary support 
estate. Id. at 415. Justice Stevens would seize on this portion of Pennsylvania Coal in his opinion 
in Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis in distinguishing the subsidence law at issue in 
that case. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text. 
44 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. 
45 Id. at 413, 415. 
46 See id. at 416. 
47 See id. at 413. 
48 Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "The State merely prevents the owner from making a use 
which interferes with paramount rights of the public." Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis 
scolded the Court for second-guessing the judgment of the local legislature and courts as to the 
best way to achieve this purpose. Id. at 420-21 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
51Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Four years later, in the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., the Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance 
against due process and equal protection attacks.52 Euclid involved a 
facial challenge to the validity of a comprehensive zoning ordinance. 
Despite the fact that the ordinance diminished the plaintiff's property 
values substantially by barring industrial uses in residential zones,s3 
the Court upheld the ordinance as a proper exercise of the police 
power. 54 While the Court emphasized the many benefits that flow from 
a comprehensive zoning scheme, it did not uphold the ordinance sim-
ply because the ordinance restricted a "noxious use" nor because the 
zoning scheme provided an average reciprocity of advantage. 55 Rather 
the Court's inquiry was one of substantive due process.56 The legal 
focus of Justice Sutherland's majority opinion was on the legitimacy 
of the municipality's purposes and the means chosen to achieve them.57 
In the wake of Pennsylvania Coal and Euclid, the Supreme Court 
rested. The Court did not address the takings issue with regard to 
land-use regulations for half a century. But the basic elements of the 
debate seen in Justices Blackmun and Scalia's opinions in the Lucas 
case were nascent in the Holmes-Brandeis opinions in Pennsylvania 
Coal. On the one hand was Holmes's intuitive, ad hoc approach in 
which traditional, state law-derived common law conceptions are 
highly relevant to the definition of property interests, and the focus 
is on the property "taken." Brandeis's approach, by contrast, allowed 
an expansive and flexible police power which justifies a public right 
to prohibit undesirable uses, focuses on the claimant's broader prop-
erty interest for determining the pre-regulation value of the land-
owner's property, and allows prohibitions even where the effect on 
the use-and therefore the economic viability-of land, is extreme. 
52 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926). 
53 Ambler claimed that the Euclid zoning ordinance reduced the value of its property by about 
75%. ld. at 384. 
54 Cf Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). In Nectow, the landowner's 
property was split by a zoning boundary line, thereby diminishing its value appreciably. The 
Court held that absent a showing that the ordinance bore a substantial relation to a proper 
public purpose, it was unconstitutional as applied to the property. ld. 
55 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 391-95; Hippler, supra note 36, at 690; see also infra note 242. 
56 The Court followed the rationale of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), and other due 
process cases instead of the Pennsylvania Coal test, thus shifting its analysis from elimination 
of a noxious use to the question of public need. 
57 Courts now recognize the validity of zoning for health and safety related purposes. See 
ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 7.03 (3d ed. 1986). Zoning ordinances are 
upheld if they tend to reasonably serve the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. But 
judicial acceptance of zoning for purposes related solely to protection of the general welfare, 
aesthetics being the classic example, has been slower. See infra section IY.D. 
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While the Court had largely withdrawn from the field, these ap-
proaches would eventually resurface as landowners challenged gov-
ernment's increasingly pervasive regulation ofland as uncompensated 
takings of property. 
C. The Debate Renewed: Penn Central 
After a half-century interlude, the Supreme Court revisited the 
land-use regulatory takings issue in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City.58 Penn Central set the stage for 1980's takings law 
and continues to be influential. 59 The ordinance at issue in Penn Cen-
tral was New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law.60 The law 
created a commission to designate landmark properties.61 The law also 
contained provisions that were intended to enable property owners 
to achieve a "reasonable return" on their investment and give them 
the flexibility to use their property in ways not inconsistent with the 
law's goals.62 When Grand Central Terminal was designated a land-
mark, Penn Central, the owner of the property, sought to take advan-
tage of these provisions in order to redevelop the terminal property, 
including the airspace above the famous terminal building. The com-
pany applied for certificates of "no exterior effect" and "appropriate-
ness"; both were denied.63 Rather than seek review of the denials, or 
seek approval for an alternate approach, the company filed suit claim-
58 438 u.s. 104 (1978). The Court had issued relatively narrow decisions concerning regulatory 
takings in the interim. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States 
v. Central Eureka Mining. Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 
339 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
59 See infra section III. 
60 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108-09. 
61 [d. at 110. Interested parties were given an opportunity to be heard before designation and 
such designation was subject to approval by the city's Board of Estimate. [d. at 110-11. The 
owner of a designated property was required to keep the property "in good repair" and obtain 
commission approval to alter exterior architectural features. [d. at 111-12. Three procedures 
were available. First, the property owner could apply to the commission for a certificate that 
the proposed change would not effect the property's protected features. [d. Second, the owner 
could apply for a certificate of "appropriateness," which was issued if the commission concludes 
that the proposed change would not burden preservation of the site. [d. Both of these proce-
dures were subject to judicial review. Third, the property owner could claim insufficient return, 
in which case mechanisms were available to prevent an economic hardship. [d. at 112. 
62 [d. at 110. Under the city's zoning ordinance, the owner of a designated site who had not 
developed the property to the fullest extent allowed under zoning provisions could transfer 
development rights to nearby parcels under provisions more liberal than for sites not so 
designated. See Norman Marcus, The New York City Experience, in TRANSFERABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT RIGHTS 3 (Planning Advisory Service Report 3 (1975)). 
63 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-18. 
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ing that the law as applied to its property constituted a taking without 
compensation.64 
In denying the landowner's claim, the Supreme Court articulated 
three independent factors that courts must consider in determining 
whether a government regulation that diminishes the value of prop-
erty amounts to a taking: the character of the government action, the 
economic impact of the action on the landowner, and the effect of the 
action on the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions.65 As articulated in Penn Central and subsequent decisions, the 
character of the action and the economic impact prongs are sufficient 
in some cases to establish a taking.66 The concept of reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations is less well developed, particularly in land-
use cases.67 
With respect to the economic impact prong, the Court, echoing 
Brandeis, announced that the inquiry "does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated."68 Rather, the in-
quiry focuses on the "nature and extent of the interference with rights 
in the parcel as a whole."69 'fuming to the specific economic impact of 
the landmark law on Penn Central, the Court observed that not only 
could the company continue to use the property as it historically had 
been used-which the Court assumed to be in accord with the land-
owner's "primary expectation" -but the company could also, under 
the landmark law's provisions, obtain a "reasonable return" on its 
investment.7o The Court deemed significant the fact that Penn Central 
could apply for approval of a different structure than the company 
had in fact proposed, and thus had not, as a matter of fact, been denied 
all use of even the airspace.71 Finally, the Court emphasized that Penn 
Central could transfer development rights to other parcels.72 Thus, 
64 [d. at 11S-19. 
65 [d. at 124. 
66 See infra section III. 
67 For a recent case, see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536 (11th 
Cir.1994). 
68 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. 
69 [d. at 130--31. The Court also rejected Penn Central's arguments that it was unduly and 
uniquely burdened and insufficiently benefitted by the ordinance. In so doing, the Court pointed 
to the law's wide applicability and the legislative conclusion that landmark preservation confers 
a broad public benefit. [d. at 134-35. 
70 [d. at 136. 
71 [d. at 136-37. 
72 [d. at 137. The Court noted that the law's transfer of rights provision was probably not 
alone sufficient to mitigate a taking, but on the facts of the case found that the provision 
mitigated the burden on Penn Central and must be taken into account. [d. 
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the Court found, Penn Central had not been denied the reasonable 
use of its property nor had the landmark law interfered with its 
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent asserted a position closer to Holmes's 
Pennsylvania Coal opinion. Drawing on the concept of average reci-
procity of advantage, Justice Rehnquist distinguished the landmark 
law from zoning ordinances which, he stated, similarly benefit and 
burden all property owners who are similarly situated.73 Rehnquist 
also distinguished land-use regulations which merely bar a narrow set 
of noxious uses.74 Citing Holmes, Rehnquist claimed that an average 
reciprocity of advantage did not exist under the landmark law.75 Penn 
Central was "singled out" at substantial cost, "with no comparable 
reciprocal benefits."76 
The Penn Central decision marks a turning point in the Supreme 
Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. The decision precedes a 
period in which the Court continued to uphold land-use regulations 
despite their economic impact on certain property owners, while also 
taking on cases in which the Court would affirm the existence of 
inviolate spheres of property interests. The Court would also begin 
to engage in more frequent and more demanding scrutiny of the 
legislative and administrative details of land-use regulation. 
III. CURRENT REGULATORY TAKINGS CASE LAW 
Takings law since Penn Central has been characterized by a retreat 
from the type of deferential, substantive, multi-factoral analysis seen 
in that case. In its place, the Court has paid renewed attention to 
categorical, traditional, common-Iaw-based attributes of property 
ownership, the infringement of which constitute per se takings requir-
ing compensation.77 For example, the Court has identified property 
73 Id. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist would have remanded the case 
for a determination of whether the transferable development rights provided adequate compen-
sation for the taking. Id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
74Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
76Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
77 See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1621-25 (1988); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697 
(1988); see also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Life After the Takings Trilogy-A Hierarchy of Property 
Interests?, 19 STETSON L. REV. 795, 805-06 (1990) (identifying consistently stronger protection 
for property rights associated with personal liberties than for those associated with wealth 
accumulation). 
1995] VARIANCE 319 
rights in the interest earned on amounts temporarily deposited with 
a court,78 and in the right to devise real property interests.79 
Challenges to limitations on landowner property rights can be cate-
gorized according to the legal basis of the challenge. Three categories 
are identifiable in the recent caselaw.80 First are cases challenging 
government assertions of power that interfere with the physical in-
tegrity of property. Second are challenges to limitations on attributes 
of title such as rights of disposition. Third, and most important for 
present purposes, are economic challenges, those based on interfer-
ence with the landowner's freedom to exploit property economically. 
A. Physical Integrity 
The cases in which a landowner alleges that a government action 
violates the physical integrity of property ownership have led to one 
of the few bright-line rules in takings jurisprudence. Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States is one of the post-Penn Central cases in which the 
Court has identified and attempted to define inviolable spheres of 
property interests.81 In Kaiser Aetna, the Court found a taking in the 
Army Corps of Engineers's attempt to require a property owner to 
allow the boating public to use an artificial navigational channel cre-
ated by the landowner.82 The Court declared that the right to exclude 
is "universally held" and is a "fundamental element of the property 
right."&3 Any interference with the right categorically requires com-
pensation. The Corps of Engineers's demand, if complied with, would 
have constituted an "actual physical invasion," not a mere assertion 
of regulatory power.84 
78 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980). 
79 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-17 (1987). For a case limiting municipal discretion in 
zoning on the basis of alienability, see Sanderson v. City of Willman, 162 N.W.2d 494 (Minn. 1968). 
80 This classification appears in Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings After 
Lucas: Growth Management, Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will Work Better than 
Before, 22 STETSON L. REV. 409, 411 (1993). 
81 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979). 
82 Id. at 167...Q9, 179-80. The equities of the case seem to have run in the landowner's favor, 
as the Corps of Engineers had approved the dredging with virtually no conditions and then 
turned around and sought to require a servitude. See id. at 167...Q9. The decision suggests that 
the government could have required Kaiser to allow access when it issued the permit, but not 
when "petitioners have proceeded as far as they have." Id. at 180. Justice Marshall, who would 
author the Court's opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982),-which extended the category of physical invasion as categorical taking-here joined 
Justice Blackmun's dissent. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
83 Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
84 Id. at 180. 
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Again resting on the traditional interest in exclusive possession, the 
Court, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, 
carved out one of the clearest categorical takings rules.85 Loretto 
involved a New York statute that required landlords to allow cable 
television companies to install certain transmission equipment on 
their property in order to facilitate access to cable television serv-
ices.86 The Court held that where there exists a permanent physical 
presence on the subject property, then there is a taking per se.87 The 
Court distinguished permanent occupations, which "absolutely dis-
possess the owner of his rights to use, and exclude others from, his 
property," from "temporary limitations on the right to exclude."88 
B. Interference with Title 
Landowners have alleged that government imposed land-use re-
strictions, such as exactions and permit conditions, interfere with 
ownership rights associated with title.89 In these cases, land-use re-
strictions such as development conditions, impact fees, or exactions 
limit or narrow the landowner's freedom to exercise traditional rights 
of fee ownership. The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission called for a level of increased scrutiny of the 
relation, or "nexus," between land-use restrictions and the purpose of 
such restrictions.90 The decision indicated that the nature of the re-
striction influences the level of scrutiny: where the restriction has 
attributes of a physical invasion the scrutiny will be even higher than 
otherwise.91 
The regulation in Nollan would have required that an oceanfront 
landowner grant a permanent public easement of passage along the 
85 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
86 [d. at 423-24. Procedures established under the statute awarded landlords a one-time 
nominal payment-a presumptive award-for the invasion. [d. 
87 [d. at 426. 
88 [d. at 435 n.12. The Court distinguished Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980), in which it upheld a California Supreme Court decision barring a shopping center owner 
from completely denying access to persons engaged in First Amendment- protected speech. 
See 447 U.S. 74, 82-84 (1980); see also Dolan v. Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2321 (1994) (distinguishing 
Pruneyard). 
89 See Freilich & Garvin, supra note 80, at 414. Such interferences may involve a forced 
physical invasion or a restriction that causes economic diminution. Thus, there is some concep-
tual overlap among the categories in terms of the type of imposition on the landowner. The 
nature of this type of challenge, however, is unique. 
90 See 483 U.S. 825, 834-42 (1987). The question of what judicial standard should govern this 
relationship had been addressed by many state courts. At the time of Nollan, the "reasonable 
relationship" standard appeared to be emerging as a majority position. 
91 [d. 
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beach edge of the landowner's oceanfront property in order to receive 
a permit to construct a replacement house.92 The Court found that 
there the nexus was insufficient because the negative public impact 
of the activity for which the permit was sought-diminished visual 
access to the ocean caused by the construction of the N ollan house-
was simply not alleviated by the easement requirement.93 
The Court revisited Nollan in 1994. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the 
Court held that there must exist an individualized showing of rough 
proportionality between permit conditions, and other development 
exactions, and the state interest that the exactions are supposed to 
advance.94 The property at issue in Dolan was a 1.67-acre improved 
commercial parcel located partially within the hundred-year flood-
plain of a waterway.95 The landowner applied for a permit to expand 
an existing commercial use and to pave a portion of the property.96 As 
a condition of filling or building within the floodplain, which the owner 
intended to do, the city of Tigard required the owner to dedicate the 
land within the floodway for a "greenway" and an adjacent strip for 
a pedestrian/bicycle path right of way.97 The landowner sought and 
was denied a hardship variance.98 The city based its decision on its 
findings that the proposed development would have a negative impact 
on the waterway and on traffic congestion.99 
The Supreme Court began by distinguishing the land-use restric-
tions at issue in Euclid,I00 Pennsylvania Coal,101 and Agins v. City of 
Tiburon.102 Those cases, the Court found, involved "essentially legis-
lative determinations classifying entire areas."103 In addition, none of 
those cases required a landowner to actually dedicate land to the 
92 [d. at 828. 
93 [d. at 837. It should be noted that the Court was especially swayed by the interference with 
the landowner's exclusive possession. See id. at 831-32. 
94 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994). 
95 See id. at 2313. 
96 [d. at 2313-14. 
97 [d. at 2314 n.2. 
98 [d. at 2314. The ordinance authorized a variance in cases of "undue or unnecessary hardship" 
where the following five conditions were met: 1) the variance will not be detrimental to the city's 
plans and policies; 2) there are unique circumstances; 3) the proposed use is otherwise permitted; 
4) there will be no adverse effect on existing "physical and natural systems;" and 5) the hardship 
is not self-imposed and the variance is the minimum needed to alleviate the hardship. [d. at 2314 
n.3. The landowner also appealed the variance decision. [d. at 2315. 
99 [d. at 2314-15. 
100 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text. 
102 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text. 
!O3 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316-17. 
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government.104 The government conduct in Dolan, the Court noted, 
was also distinguished from zoning in that the conduct involved an 
adjudicative decision attaching conditions to development of a single 
parcel.105 The Court found that the minimal theoretical nexus between 
the development impact and the permit condition, lacking in Nollan, 
here existed.106 Rather than adopt the "reasonable relationship" test 
used in many states, the Court chose to adopt a different formula-
tion-"rough proportionality."107 The Court held that the condition 
must be supported by an individualized determination, though not 
with mathematical precision, that the condition in question is roughly 
proportional to the impact of the proposed development.108 The Court 
found that the city had failed to make specific findings sufficient to 
justify the floodway and right-of-way dedications as a development 
condition.109 Dolan thus requires that governments be able to estab-
lish that land-use restrictions not only serve legitimate purposes, but 
that they are crafted in such a way as to support a showing that the 
specific restriction placed on a given landowner is well grounded in 
fact. 
Landowners have also challenged restrictions based on interfer-
ence with attributes of title in another area of government regulation. 
These are cases where the land-use restrictions serve primarily so-
cioeconomic ends. no Such challenges have been less successful than 
those attacking resource-based restrictions. Courts have been willing 
to allow government interference with traditional property rights 
where government regulates to further the general social welfare.lll 
104 [d. 
105 [d. at 2320 n.8. 
106 [d. at 2317-18. 
107 [d. at 2319. The Court adopted this formulation in order to avoid confusion with the 
"rational basis" test employed in its Equal Protection jurisprudence. [d. 
108 [d. at 2319-20 
109 [d. at 2320. Specifically, the Court found that the city failed to show why a dedication of 
the floodway was needed, which would deprive the landowner of her right to exclude. [d. In 
addition, the city's finding that dedication of the right of way "could"-as opposed to "will" or 
"is likely to"-mitigate traffic demand created by the expansion of the landowner's business was 
insufficient. [d. at 2321-22. 
110 Regulations governing the landlord-tenant relationship have been a fertile source of con-
troversy. See, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 (N.Y.) (holding 
that ordinance establishing moratorium and requiring rehabilitation of certain residential prop-
erties and rental at controlled rates is a facial physical taking), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989); 
see also Freilich & Garvin, supra note SO, at 415. 
111 Despite the decision in Seawall, 542 N.E.2d 1059, the Supreme Court has upheld a mobile 
home rent control ordinance which prevented reoccupation by the landlord after the tenant 
vacates and allowed the tenant to assign or devise the tenancy interest. Yee v. City of Escondido, 
112 S. Ct. 1522, 1531 (1992). The ordinance did allow the landlord to withdraw the rental 
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C. Economic Impact 
The third category of takings challenges to land-use regulations are 
those based primarily on a regulation's economic effects.112 These 
property from the market. [d. at 1528. Though plaintiffs argued that the regulation required 
the landowner to suffer a physical invasion, the Court distinguished physical from regulatory 
takings and declined to apply the Loretto rule. [d. at 1528--30. The public purpose behind direct 
social and economic regulation of property thus appears to warrant a higher constitutional 
stature than is accorded to measures whose public benefits are less direct, such as those 
protecting natural resources. Thus the Yee court cited Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. U.S., 379 
U.S. 241, 261 (1964), in noting that parties who engage in commerce cannot be heard to object 
to legitimate social and economic regulation. [d. at 1530. See also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988) (upholding rent control ordinance as legitimate exercise of police power). 
112 Ripeness or "finality" requirements, and exhaustion of remedies, are important thresholds 
in such challenges, with implications for the use of variance procedures. The prevailing rationale 
for imposing ripeness requirements is that an application must be reviewed and an ordinance 
applied before a takings assessment can be meaningful. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-53 (1986). Ripeness requirements are the most impervious and 
frequently encountered bar to the challenging party. But see David L. Callies, The Lucas Case: 
Regulatory Takings Past, Present, and Future, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Sept. 1992, at 4. 
The party challenging a land-use restriction must receive a final determination with regard to 
a development proposal before a court will hear the case because the court cannot tell if a 
regulation goes "too far" until it knows how far the regulation goes. The party challenging the 
regulation must determine what use can be made of the property, and must pursue state 
remedies so as to determine whether "just compensation" will be forthcoming. See MacDonald, 
477 U.S. at 350--53 (holding that rejection of plans does not make a taking claim ripe); Williamson 
County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190 (1985) (finding case not 
ripe where plaintiff had not requested a variance nor sought compensation through local and 
state procedures); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1453 (requiring a "final and 
authoritative determination" before a regulatory taking claim may be heard), amended, 830 F.2d 
968 (9th Cir. 1987), and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). Unlike exhaustion, which focuses on 
whether the plaintiff pursued available procedures, the focus of the ripeness inquiry is on the 
nature of the determination below. 
In the wake of the Lucas decision there has been some debate over the vitality of the ripeness 
doctrine in land-use cases. See Callies, supra at 4; see also Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness After 
Lucas, in AFTER LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL: LAND USE REGULATION AND 
THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION 11, 23 (David L. Callies ed., 1992) [here-
inafter AFTER LUCAS] (arguing that Lucas de-constitutionalizes ripeness, which is no longer a 
prerequisite for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, but is merely a matter of Article III case 
or controversy concern). The Lucas Court rejected South Carolina's argument that because the 
state had added a variance procedure to its regulations after Lucas filed his claim, the claim was 
not ripe. The Court's decision, however, was based on the fact that the South Carolina Supreme 
Court had made a final determination on the merits of Lucas's takings claim. See Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2890--91 (1992). While federal courts generally have 
been consistent in applying the ripeness requirement in as-applied takings challenges, some 
courts have carved out a futility exception and have reviewed a decision where it appears to be 
futile for the challenging party to continue to seek a remedy through available procedures. See 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc., v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 387 (1988) (refusing to require plaintiff 
to submit alternative applications for a wetlands dredge and fill permit because regulations 
provided only a limited exception). State courts have begun to apply finality doctrine as devel-
oped in the federal courts. See, e.g, Port Clinton Assoc. v. Board of Selectmen, 587 A.2d 126, 133 
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constitute the most frequently litigated cases in the field of regulatory 
takings.113 The traditional caselaw governing the grant of a zoning 
variance will be seen to be closely related to the standards developed 
in economic regulatory takings claims. These standards are thus 
highly relevant to environmental land-use regulation takings analysis. 
The essence of the rule in regulatory takings requires that an owner 
be compensated where he or she is denied the economically viable use 
of the property. This rule, rooted in the Court's Penn Central deci-
sion,114 has remained intact as the Court has revisited the takings 
issue since that decision. 
An economic challenge to a zoning regulation formed the basis for 
the Supreme Court's first major pronouncement on regulatory tak-
ings in land use after Penn Central. Agins v. City of Tiburon involved 
a challenge to a municipality's open-space protective zoning ordi-
nance.115 In response to a state mandate, the city of Tiburon, Califor-
nia, amended its zoning ordinance, placing certain ridgetop land in an 
open-space zone. This led the landowners to claim that the amend-
ments rendered their property valueless.116 Under the test announced 
by the Court, a restriction amounts to a taking if the restriction either 
fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest or denies an 
(Conn.) (applying finality rule to landowner's claim that denial of permit to expand docks 
constituted a regulatory taking), eert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 64 (1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 
N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1992) (applying finality rule where landowner terminated administrative 
appeal from denial of permission to build revetment). 
Exhaustion of remedies may also bar a challenger's claim. See generally DANIEL R. MAN-
DELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 8.08--8.10 (3d ed. 1993). Generally, where a landowner alleges in 
state court that a land-use regulation as applied to his or her property constitutes a taking, the 
claim is barred unless the landowner has exhausted available administrative remedies. This 
means that before a court will hear an as-applied taking claim, the landowner must pursue 
avenues for relief provided in the applicable law. The primary exception to the exhaustion 
requirement is the futility doctrine. Under this exception, a court will hear a case if the 
landowner can show that relief is unavailable under the existing administrative procedures 
because the permit- or variance-granting authority has made it clear that it will deny the 
request. See, e.g., Karches v. City of Cincinnati, 526 N.E.2d 1350, 1355-56 (Ohio 1988) (applying 
futility exception); see also Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991) (adopting 
rule that challenging party must have made at least one meaningful application before court 
will consider futility exception), eert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 192 (1992). But see Presbytery of Seattle 
v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 916-17 (Wash.) (finding futility exception disfavored and not 
applying it), eert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). 
113 Freilich & Garvin, supra note 80, at 417. 
114 See supra section II.C. 
115 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
116Id. at 257-58. The zoning limited the number of residences that could be built on the 
five-acre tract to between one and five. Agins also asserted that an aborted eminent domain 
action against the property constituted a temporary taking. Id. at 258 n.3. 
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owner economically viable use of the land.ll7 The Court observed that 
"the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public 
interests."118 In weighing these interests, the Court found that, in 
light of the legislative purposes and the shared benefits and burdens 
upon Agins and adjacent landowners, the ordinance substantially ad-
vanced a legitimate state interest,119 and that the ordinance did not 
prevent Agins from developing the land.120 
The two-part Agins analysis has guided much of the inquiry in 
subsequent economic diminution-based takings claims.121 Courts have 
tended to focus on the purpose advanced to support a land-use restric-
tion and the resulting economic impact on the landowner. 
In scrutinizing legislative purpose, the Supreme Court's post-Penn 
Central takings jurisprudence has, with one notable exception,122 been 
characterized by less deference to, and increased skepticism of, legis-
lative and administrative justifications for limitations on land use. The 
Lucas and Dolan decisions conceptually narrowed the realm in which 
the state may assuredly regulate land use without being required to 
monetarily compensate the landowner.123 In practice, government 
maintains the ability to implement appropriate land-use regulations.124 
Much of the debate among commentators has focused on the inquiry 
into economic impact on the landowner. To constitute a presumptive 
economic taking, a restriction must leave the landowner with no eco-
nomically viable use of the land, that is, virtually no ability to eco-
117Id. at 260. The precise relationship between the Agins two-step and Penn Central three-
part tests has been the subject of some analysis. See, e.g., Ann T. Kadlecek, The Effect of Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 WASH. L. REV. 415, 
420, 434 (1993) (noting lack of congruity between the two tests, but concluding that in the wake 
of Lucas, tests are synthesized). 
118 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. 
119Id. at 261--62. 
120 Id. at 262--63. 
121 Most takings litigation occurs at the state rather than the federal level. The Agins test has 
been influential on state court analysis. For a brief overview of state court takings analysis, see 
MANDELKER, supra note 112, § 2.25-2.31. 
122 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); see infra notes 
134-46 and accompanying text. 
123 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899, 2901 (1992) (asserting 
that mere legislative recitation of public purpose is insufficient to justify a complete ban on use 
of property). 
124 See, e.g., Fran M. Layton, Far Public Agencies, an Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound 
of Cure, LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 58; see also Richard C. Ausness, Wild Dunes and 
Serbonian Bogs: The Impact of the Lucas Decision on Shoreline Protection Programs, 70 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 437 (1993); Todd D. Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the 
Takings Clause: Is There Life Far Environmental Regulations After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REP. 287 (1993); William Funk, Revolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to 
Lucas' Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891 (1993). 
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nomically exploit, through alteration of or improvements to, a parcel 
of land.125 Although the Supreme Court has refrained from giving 
lower courts extensive guidance on precisely how to make the deter-
mination,l26 a restriction that prevents the landowner from putting 
the property to any use that can be fairly described as economically 
viable or beneficial probably falls into the category of a taking based 
on economic deprivation.127 If, as the Court held in Lucas, no economi-
cally viable or beneficial use remains in the property, the restriction 
must be valid based on background principles of property and tort 
law in order to avoid being adjudged a taking.l28 
If economically viable or beneficial uses do remain, courts, as in 
prior cases, will balance the public interest put forth to justify the 
restriction against the economic impact on the landowner. Sometimes 
the analysis includes explicit consideration of the restriction's inter-
ference with the landowner's investment-backed expectations, though 
again, the Court has not given lower courts extensive guidance on 
how to conduct this inquiry.129 The Lucas decision suggests that courts 
must try to assess how the landowner's expectations of property use 
125 See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-95. 
126 See Fred P. Bosselman, Scalia on Land, in AFTER LUCAS, supra note 112, at 82 n.94 (listing 
20 different formulations of total deprivation concept in the Lucas decision alone). 
127 A number of pre-Lucas cases found no taking unless "all use" of the property was denied. 
See Freilich & Garvin, supra note 80, at 420 n.51. 
128 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. While traditional nuisance doctrine recognizes harm to public 
land and resources, there is disagreement as to whether nuisance concepts can provide an 
adequate grounding for modern land-use restrictions. See id. at 2901 (including "degree of harm 
to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property" as factor in analysis). But see Joseph 
L. Sax, Regulating Land and Resources in the Post-Lucas Era, LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 
39, 42. Professor Sax suggests that the Lucas majority decision's idea of what constitutes a 
nuisance is narrow, a view shared by Justice Stevens in his dissent. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 
2922 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
One area in which courts generally uphold natural resource-related restrictions is floodplain 
zoning, particularly where some uses are allowed, because of the human hazard in allowing 
construction in flood prone areas. See First English Evangelical, Lutheran Church v. County of 
Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding, on remand, city's morato-
rium on building in floodplain because of public hazard and fact that ordinance allowed land-
owner some use), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Fortier v. City of Spearfish, 433 N.W.2d 228, 
231 (S.D. 1988). 
129 What guidance there is has arisen in areas other than land-use. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-14 (1984) (finding company's submission of trade-secret data 
to government in order to register product under federal law, where company knew conditions 
under which public disclosure could occur, not an interference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith 449 U.S. 144, 161 (1980) 
(identifying "unilateral expectations" and "abstract need" as outside the scope of protectable 
property interests); see also Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A 
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993). 
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are shaped by the state's property laws and traditional tort concepts 
such as nuisance.13o 
'!\vo distinct sets of questions have arisen in the analysis of value 
diminution. These concern the proper geographic and temporal pa-
rameters of the inquiry.131 In other words, courts ask where the prop-
erty owner's land holding physically begins and when the government 
restriction on his or her use of the property begins. A brief excursion 
into Supreme Court precedent points out the magnitude and sig-
nificance of how these inquiries are conceptualized. 
Since Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Court has struggled with 
the critical issue of how to determine the proper "baseline value" -the 
value of the parcel before a regulation has worked its effects-to be 
used in assessing the economic effect of a land-use restriction on the 
property owner.132 The prevailing rule is that the value is based on a 
parcel's totality, not just the part that is restricted.133 This rule, central 
to the Court's Penn Central decision, was reaffirmed in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedictis, one of the 1987 "Trilogy" of Su-
preme Court takings cases.134 
Keystone involved a facial challenge to Pennsylvania's Bituminous 
Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act.135 The Subsidence Act 
prohibited mining that causes subsidence damage to public buildings, 
houses, and cemeteries.136 Regulations under the Act required coal 
companies to leave half the coal in place in these areas, though the 
percentage could be waived or made more stringent under the cir-
cumstances.137 The plaintiff coal companies asserted that the regula-
tions effectively destroyed their rights in the "support estate."138 
In denying the coal companies' claim, the Court stressed that the 
Act served a legitimate public purpose: prevention of subsidence.139 
130 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. 
131 See Freilich & Garvin, supra note 80, at 421-29; infra text accompanying notes 132-49. 
132 260 U.S. 393, 413-16 (1922). The phrase "baseline value" is from ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 461-63 (1992). 
133 See Freilich & Garvin, supra note 80, at 420-21 
134 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The other cases were First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). 
135 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1406.1-1406.21 (Supp. 1993). 
136 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476. 
137 [d. at 477 n.7. 
138 [d. at 496-97. Under traditional Pennsylvania law, the support estate-the right to subja-
cent support-is distinct from the mining estate. See generally Montgomery, supra note 42. 
139 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485, 492-93. Justice Stevens went to great lengths in attempting to 
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The Court found that the support estate alone is not the proper 
measure of the baseline value.140 Rather, the baseline value properly 
includes the value of the surface and mining estates as well.141 The 
coal companies had not shown the extent to which the Act reduced 
the value of the support estate.142 The Court thus concluded that there 
was no showing that the Act denied the coal companies the economi-
cally viable use of their property.143 
Keystone thus holds that courts should consider property as a 
whole-not merely the area subject to the restriction-for purposes 
of determining the baseline value. Should courts adopt an approach 
in which they consider only the restricted portion,144 the diminution 
in value or ability to use the property would of course be more severe. 
The possibility that courts will conduct land-use takings analysis in 
this manner may have been increased in light of Justice Scalia's Lucas 
dictum questioning the baseline value affirmed in Penn Central.145 
Courts thus far have not embraced such an approach.146 
distinguish the Mine Subsidence Act from the Kohler Act invalidated in Pennsylvania Coal. 
See id. at 485-93. But see id. at 509-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Kohler Act 
was invalidated not because it failed to promote a public purpose but because it failed to provide 
compensation). 
140 [d. at 480. The district court had rejected Keystone's argument that the support estate 
was the most valuable strand in its bundle of rights, the destruction of which constitutes a 
taking. See id. at 479. Keystone apparently had rested this argument on the Supreme Court's 
holding in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64--68 (1979), in which the Court rejected a claim that 
the prohibitions on trade in certain artifacts pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act and Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act constituted an uncompensated taking. 
141 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500--01. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. at 499. 
144 Some commentators have termed this approach "conceptual severance." See Margaret Jane 
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1674 (1988). 
145 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. There is life in the Penn Central approach. See Concrete Pipe & 
Prod. of Cal., Inc., v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993) 
(citing Penn Central for proposition that property is not divided into "what was taken and what 
was left" in order to demonstrate a compensable taking of the former) (unanimous section of 
opinion). 
146 See, e.g., McAndrews v. New Bank of New England, 796 F. Supp. 613, 616 (D. Mass. 1992), 
aff'd, 989 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1993) (assessing impact of Federal Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act on lessor's rights and finding no taking where lessor retained 
"full bundle" of common-law rights of landlord except right to terminate when Federal Deposit 
and Insurance Corporation was appointed receiver); Bevan v. Brandon Township, 475 N.W.2d 
37, 42-43 (Mich. 1991) (holding that two contiguous parcels owned by same parties though 
purchased at different times are viewed as a whole for takings analysis), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
941 (1992); Bernardsville Quarry Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377, 1389 (N.J. 
1992) (rejecting claim that local ordinance limiting quarry operation deprived landowner of a 
separate estate or interest in property); see also infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. See 
generally Michelman, supra note 7, at 1614-21. 
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With respect to the temporal dimensions of a land-use restriction, 
the Court addressed the question of when a restriction effects a taking 
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County 
of Los Angeles.147 The First English Court established the rule that 
a landowner must be compensated for a temporary taking. In that 
case, the plaintiff claimed that a temporary construction ban, enacted 
after a forest fire created a flood hazard on part of its property, denied 
all use of the land and therefore constituted an uncompensated tak-
ing.148 The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether 
the plaintiff had been denied all use of its property for the period in 
which the ban was in effect.149 Thus, to the extent that a land-use 
restriction has worked a taking, the government must compensate the 
landowner for the taking from the time the restriction took effect. 
Land-use controls-environmentally based controls in particular-
must operate against this constitutional backdrop and within these 
constitutional limits. Environmental regulation has developed over 
the past quarter century in response to our increased scientific knowl-
edge and expanding awareness of the value of existing features of our 
environment. These regulations have increasingly conflicted with tra-
ditionallandowner beliefs in the freedom to use legally owned land as 
they wish. Many landowners have reacted by asserting that land-use 
restrictions and limitations violate the Constitution's prohibition on 
uncompensated takings. The Supreme Court, and lower courts, have 
attempted to clarify the situations that amount to takings. Regulatory 
and planning communities fear that courts will more readily find their 
actions constitute takings. Such communities seek greater predict-
147 482 U.s. 304, 321 (1987). The Court thereby adopted a position that Justice Brennan had 
been urging since his well-known dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 
450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981). 
148 See First English, 482 U.S. at 308. 
149Id. at 322. On remand, the state court found that the building restriction was a proper 
safety measure and did not constitute a taking. First English Evangelical, Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). The general rule is that time 
required for processing permit and variance applications does not constitute a taking. First 
English, 482 U.S. at 321; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (noting 
that fluctuations in value during government decisionmaking are necessary attributes of own-
ership of real property). The subjects of what constitutes a temporary taking, and how compen-
sation for such takings is to be determined, are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally 
Joseph LaRusso, Comment, "Paying for the Change": First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles and the Calculation of Interim Damages for 
Regulatory Takings, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 551 (1990); Jay Harris Rabin, Note, It's Not 
Just Compensation, It's a Theory of Valuation as Well: Valuing "Just Compensation" for 
Temporary Regulatory Takings, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 247 (1989). 
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ability as to when a taking will occur, so as to avoid taking property 
in the first place. 
One time-tested means for avoiding takings is the variance. When 
courts review variance decisions in the context of environmental land-
use regulations, they will not be entering uncharted waters. Courts 
have been conducting similar assessments in the traditional land-use 
area of zoning for some time. Courts have reviewed local decisions 
granting and denying zoning variances against a constitutional back-
drop for over half a century. The next section of this Comment out-
lines the development of this caselaw of the zoning variance. 
IV. THE VARIANCE IN ZONING 
The variance in land-use regulation emerged in the context of what 
has come to be known as traditional Euclidean zoning.150 Because the 
variance was originally conceived as a means to ensure the constitu-
tionality of zoning ordinances, the caselaw that has developed around 
the variance reflects the background concerns articulated in the Su-
preme Court's Pennsylvania Coal decision.l51 Zoning ordinances 
would remain constitutional by building in a mechanism that would 
avoid imposing hardship on individual landowners.152 The variance 
would thus operate as comprehensive zoning's constitutional "safety 
valve."153 Additionally, the variance process would create a solid deci-
sional foundation and an adequate record in the event of litigation.l54 
In practice, however, the variance has a history of misuse and incon-
sistent application at the locallevel.155 As a result, courts have devel-
oped a comprehensive body oflaw identifying and limiting the circum-
stances under which a variance may properly be granted.l56 
A. Variance Administration and Procedure 
'!\vo types of variances are generally recognized: the use variance, 
which allows a landowner to engage in a land use otherwise disallowed 
by the applicable rules, and the area variance, which grants the land-
150 "Euclidean zoning" refers to that type of zoning characterized by the identification of 
use-based zones, traditionally residential, business, and industrial. Uses are typically allowed 
hierarchically, that is, uses allowed in a "higher" zone are permitted in a "lower" zone, but not 
vice versa. 
151 See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text. 
152 ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 19. 
153 Id §§ 19.07-19.12. 
154 Id. § 19.08. 
155 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
156 See infra sections IV.B. and IV.C. 
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owner an exception from strict compliance with physical standards 
such as setbacks.157 Courts traditionally have been less willing to 
uphold use variances, which they believe pose a greater threat to the 
integrity, and fairness, of a zoning scheme than area variances.158 The 
judiciary's reluctance to grant use variances is primarily intended to 
reinforce the fundamental means by which zoning operates: segrega-
tion of uses. Moreover, compared to an area variance, a use variance 
generally possesses a greater potential to enable a landowner unfairly 
to receive a substantially larger return on property than a similarly 
situated landowner who cannot engage in the use. Thus, in some 
states, courts have not allowed use variances at all, even in the ab-
sence of a prohibition in the enabling statute or zoning ordinance.159 
The grant is usually referred to as a "variance," though some stat-
utes refer to "special exceptions."16o Despite the similarity in lan-
guage, the true variance must be distinguished from the so-called 
"special permit." Under traditional zoning practice, the special permit 
is another method for providing flexibility in land-use regulation. 
While a variance enables the landowner to deviate from generally 
applicable standards, the special permit is issued where the land-
owner demonstrates compliance with applicable performance stand-
ards.161 In the absence of such a showing, the permit is denied. 
Under the typical variance procedure, a landowner who has been 
denied a permit may apply to a reviewing body, typically an appeals 
board, which is authorized to grant the exception under a set of 
guidelines or standards.l62 The statute may also specify that the re-
viewing body must hold a hearing or make findings of fact to support 
157 See infra notes 219-32 and accompanying text. 
158 For example, it was only in 1986 that the Missouri Supreme Court, in the case of Matthew 
v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Mo. 1986), recognized the validity of use variances. 
159 See, e.g., Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n., 605 A.2d 885, 890 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1992). 
160 Many statutes use the term "special exception" in the context of provisions that authorize 
a board to grant variances in classes of cases. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-345(c) (1991). 
Some statutes use the term generically to refer to mechanisms such as the variance. See, e.g., 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.315 (Michie 1990). 
161 See ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.03. 
162 Under section 7 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the board of adjustment has 
the power: 
To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the 
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special 
conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in 
unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and 
substantial justice done. 
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1926) [hereinafter SSZEA]. 
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its decision.163 More commonly, however, the courts impose such re-
quirements.164 Provisions such as these facilitate deliberative analysis 
and decisionmaking, constrain discretion, and provide a record for 
judicial review.165 
Judicial review of the appeals board's decision is normally available. 
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) allows judicial 
review through a writ of certiorari.166 The level of scrutiny is nomi-
nally low. Courts have not refrained, however, from scrutinizing the 
actions of local appeals boards.167 In addition, some states allow a 
reviewing court to receive additional evidence.168 
The enabling statute's standards governing the board or body's 
decision are usually drawn broadly, with more specific criteria left for 
incorporation into regulations, local ordinances, or articulation by 
reviewing courts.169 The original drafters of zoning ordinances sought 
to ensure that appeals bodies had sufficient discretion to enable the 
variance procedure to serve its safety-valve function, but not so much 
discretion as to constitute an impermissibly vague delegation.170 The 
"unnecessary hardship" standard adopted in the SSZEA has become 
the most common standard used in the zoning context.l7l The standard 
authorizes the appeals board to grant a variance where, owing to 
"special conditions," literal enforcement of the regulation would con-
stitute an unnecessary hardship.172 Despite some early findings that 
such a standard granted too much discretion to appeals boards,173 the 
standard has come to be widely upheld. 
The SSZEA, and some statutes and ordinances, also explicitly re-
quire that the grant of the variance not be detrimental to the public 
163 65 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 65, paras. 5/11-13-11 (Smith-Hurd 1993). 
164 See Topanga Ass'n. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 12, 15-16 
(Cal. 1974). 
165 In a seminal case, the California courts read such a requirement into the criteria for 
granting variances. See Topanga, 522 P.2d at 16 (holding that grant of variance must be based 
on findings and that reviewing court must scrutinize record for substantial evidence to support 
grant). 
166 SSZEA, supra note 162, § 7. 
167 See Topanga, 522 P.2d at 19; Cook v. Town of Sanbornton, 392 A.2d 1201 (N.H. 1978) 
(adopting less deferential standard of review than formerly used). 
168 Section 7 of the SSZEA allows a reviewing court to receive new evidence. 
169 By way of contrast, Indiana's dual standards are more detailed than typical statutory 
criteria. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-7-4-918.4, 36-7-4-918.5 (Burns 1989) (use and area variance 
criteria). 
170 See Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HARv. L. REV 668 (1969). 
171 SSZEA, supra note 162, § 7. The term "undue hardship" has also been used in some cases. 
See generally ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.09. 
172 SSZEA, supra note 162, § 7. 
173 See, e.g., Speroni v. Board of Appeals, 15 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1938). 
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interest.174 Consideration of health, safety, and welfare may be re-
quired.175 Some courts have read such a general requirement into the 
variance criteria. 
The judicial process of filling out the contours of the unnecessary 
hardship standard has been driven by the need to reign in and stand-
ardize the issuance of variances by local appeals boards.176 Despite the 
narrowness of the circumstances in which variances should be 
granted under the enabling act and ordinance, appeals boards have 
been willing to grant or deny variances for a variety of other reasons. 
'!\vo 1960s studies demonstrated that the variance-granting process 
has been transformed from its original intended purpose as a consti-
tutional safety valve and has been subject to abuse.177 
B. Otto and its Progeny 
Courts early established that the applicant for a variance must 
satisfy a difficult burden in order to show that an unnecessary hard-
ship exists.178 In the seminal 1939 case of Otto v. Steinhilber, the New 
York State Court of Appeals set forth a statement of the showing 
required to satisfy the burden.179 Under the test established by the 
court in Otto, a variance applicant must show (1) that the land in 
question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose 
174 SSZEA, supra note 162, § 7; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674.33(b) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.1-495(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). 
175 See infra notes 205--07 and accompanying text. 
176 A classic study examined the variance in practice in Baltimore and Boston. See Ronald M. 
Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. 
L. REV. 3 (1969). After reviewing the theoretical underpinnings of the variance power and 
noting the strict construction courts have imposed on zoning boards, Shapiro found that the 
zoning boards in his study had performed miserably. [d. at 3--9. The variance procedure, he 
found, conceived as a safety valve, had "ruptured into a steady 'leak.'" [d. at 9. The author 
documents confusion, disregard of harmful consequences, improper influence, and other opera-
tional maladies. [d. at 11--19 passim; see also Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The 
Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962). Misuse of the 
variance has been noted in a more socially critical vein. For one of the more venerable examples, 
see RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 7 (1966) (alleging deliberate misuse of variance 
by insular suburbs attempting to defeat planning goals). 
177 One study found that despite New Hampshire's strict variance standard, variances have 
been routinely granted: In each of the ten cases in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
reviewed variance applications between 1987 and 1992, the Court found that a variance should 
not be granted. See David L. Kent, The Presumption in Favor of Granting Zoning Variances, 
N.H. B. J., June 1993, at 29. 
178 See, for example, Norcross v. Board of Appeal, 150 N.E. 887, 890 (Mass. 1926), an oft-cited 
pre-Euclid case in which the court stated that "the power of authorizing variations from the 
general provisions of the statute is designed to be sparingly exercised." 
179 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939). 
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allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique 
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood 
which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; 
and (3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the 
essential character of the locality.180 A variance applicant must satisfy 
each part of the test. Many states employ similar tests for assessing 
variances,181 and have adopted restrictive readings of the required 
showing. 182 
Under the "reasonable return" prong, most courts invalidate grants 
of variances unless the landowner has met the burden of showing that 
the land will be otherwise rendered valueless or unusable for any 
permitted purpose.183 The courts' focus is thus more on remaining 
value as opposed to diminution in value from a baseline. Courts con-
sistently hold that financial impact alone is insufficient to establish 
unnecessary hardship and that the landowner must show that there 
is no profitable use for the land.l84 A decision of the Michigan Court 
of Appeals underscored how difficult it can be to show that there is 
no reasonable return, approvingly citing authority that the landowner 
must show no reasonable return, hardship amounting to confiscation, 
or the deprivation of all reasonable use. l85 Other courts, along with an 
enabling statute,186 have noted this anti-confiscatory role.187 
180 I d. at 853. 
181 It should be noted that the Otto test has not been universally adopted. ROGER A. CUN-
NINGHAM, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.7 (1984). The test has, however, been widely influential 
and is generally recognized as the "classic statement" of the unnecessary hardship test. MAN-
DELKER, supra note 112, § 6.44. It thus forms an accurate framework for an exposition of 
variance law. 
182 See, e.g., Gullickson v. Stark County Bd. of Comm'rs, 474 N.W.2d 890 (N.D. 1991); Chacona 
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 599 A.2d 255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). For detailed treatment of 
caselaw development of the Otto test in New York, see Phyllis A. Erikson, Comment, Variance 
Law in New York: An Examination and Proposal, 44 ALB. L. REV. 781 (1980). 
183 O'Keefe v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 192 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Commons v. 
Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adj., 410 A.2d 1138, 1143 (N.J. 1980) (noting that compensation is due 
where denial of variance renders property unusable); Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. 
Earl Scheib Realty Corp., 301 A.2d 423, 425--26 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). The burden on the 
landowner is to show that there is no reasonable return under any of the permitted uses of the 
property. See, e.g., Holasek v. Village of Medina, 226 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 1975) ("The 
allowance of a variance is compelled only where there has been an unlawful taking of property 
in a constitutional sense, demonstrated by the landowner's inability to put his land to any 
beneficial use unless the variance is granted."). 
184 See, e.g., OK Properties v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 601 A.2d 953, 954-55 (R.!. 1992); Houston 
v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adj., 488 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972). 
185 Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Ass'n. v. Leo, 153 N.W.2d 162, 166-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1967). 
186 Under the Virginia zoning enabling statute, a landowner who makes a showing that denial 
would impose a "hardship approaching confiscation" is eligible for a variance. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 15.1-495 (Michie Supp. 1993). 
187 Sapero v. City of Baltimore, 200 A.2d 74, 75--76 (Md. 1964) (would-be taking required to 
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That a variance is not to be granted merely to avoid a negative 
financial impact on the landowner runs mantra-like through the his-
tory of the variance cases.l88 Nevertheless, courts in limited instances 
have allowed a variance-generally an area variancel89-to issue even 
where the burden is well short of confiscation.l90 These courts have 
shown a willingness to balance the financial burden on the landowner 
against such factors as the impact on neighboring properties, the 
spirit and purposes of the zoning ordinance, and the public interest 
generally.191 For example, one court sustained the grant of an area 
variance in order to prevent destruction of a mature stand of pine 
trees.l92 This flexible approach to variances remains exceptional and 
is rarely used to allow the grant of use variances because of the 
transformative impact on neighborhood character and the potential 
to undermine the integrity of the zoning scheme. 
As in the cases discussed previously,193 the issue of how a court 
should assess a land-use restriction's economic impact on the land-
owner and the reasonableness of remaining uses has also arisen in 
zoning cases. The most important questions regarding fairness to the 
landowner and the integrity of zoning through administration concern 
allow variance); Ouimette v. City of Somersworth, 402 A.2d 159, 161 (N.H. 1979); Pondfield Rd. 
Co. v. Village of Bronxville, 150 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div.) (upholding zoning ordinance against 
challenge because variance enables avoidance or mitigation of taking), aff'd without opinion, 
135 N.E.2d 725 (1956). 
188 See ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.22 (collecting cases). Similarly recited is the rule that 
a variance is not warranted simply because it will render the property more profitable. See, e.g., 
Perrin v. Town of Kittery, 591 A.2d 861, 863 (Me. 1991) (''We have repeatedly recognized that a 
reasonable return is not the maximum return."); Glennon v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lower 
Milford, 529 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) ("[T]he hardship required to support an 
entitlement to a variance cannot be purely economic or financial."); Baum v. Lunsford, 365 S.E.2d 
739,741 (Va. 1988) ("[F]inancialloss, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify the granting of 
a variance."). 
189 See infra notes 219-30 and accompanying text. 
190 See, e.g., Board of Adj. v. Murphy, 591 So. 2d 505, 506-07 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (upholding 
jury finding of no feasible use under ordinance and allowing multi-factoral assessment; evidence 
indicated that property was on the market for 30 years without serious purchase offers or 
inquiries); Nelson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 162 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind. 1959); Kruvant v. Cedar 
Grove, 414 A.2d 9,14 (N.J. 1980) (allowing variance where zoning ordinance had been declared 
unconstitutional). 
191 See, e.g., Torello v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 16 A.2d 591 (Conn. 1940). But such cases are 
exceptional; Carter v. City of Nashua, 308 A.2d 847, 855 (N.H. 1973) (where a financial hardship 
becomes unduly oppressive because of unique conditions, a use or area variance may be war-
ranted, provided it does not adversely affect the public interest). 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and 
Planning §§ 880-81 (1992); see also A.M.S. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 206 A.2d 833, 834 
(Conn. 1965) (refusing to grant variance where applicant invested $135,000 in USE) not permitted 
under ordinance). 
192 Holmes v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Kennett Township, 396 A.2d 859, 861 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1978). 
193 See supra part III.C. 
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a landowner who has multiple adjacent or proximate holdings. Courts 
have consistently approached such questions by viewing a land-
owner's holdings in the aggregate and have not felt bound by the 
arbitrary and manipulable drawing of lot lines.194 It was thus early 
established that zoning's setback requirements, which completely 
deny the freedom to build on a substantial portion of the landowner's 
property, do not constitute a "partial" taking.195 
A landowner must not only show that the land is left with no other 
reasonable use, but usually must produce objective financial evidence 
that no reasonable return is possible under permitted uses.196 Sus-
tained unsuccessful efforts to sell a property for permitted uses are 
often deemed a sufficient basis upon which to find that a reasonable 
return is not possible.197 The New York State Court of Appeals has 
identified several factors that a landowner should address in showing 
whether he or she can achieve a reasonable return on the property at 
issue.198 These factors are: (1) the amount the applicant paid for the 
entire parcel; (2) the present value of the parcel or part of it; (3) 
maintenance expenses; (4) taxes on the land; (5) mortgages and en-
cumbrances; (6) income; and (7) other relevant factors, including the 
applicant's estimate of what constitutes a reasonable return.199 
The other requirements of the Otto test, uniqueness of the burden 
on the landowner and absence of an impact on the area, serve different 
purposes and focus on different factors than the reasonable return 
requirement. The unique burden requirement, which is embodied in 
some statutes,200 requires that a landowner show that the burden is 
194 See, e.g., Blow v. Town of Berlin, 560 A.2d 378, 379 (Vt. 1989) (in assessing variance criteria, 
court looks to all of the landowner's property, not simply parcel for which variance is sought). 
The "checkerboarding" cases provide one of the more well known examples. In such cases a 
landowner subdivides a parcel into smaller parcels in a checkerboard fashion so that adjacent 
lots are not owned by the same record owner in order to circumvent zoning or subdivision rules 
that apply to contiguous lots under common ownership. See Baldiga v. Board of Appeals, 482 
N.E.2d 809, 812 n.4 (Mass. 1985) (describing practice of checkerboarding). 
195 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
196 A leading formulation requires that the landowner produce "dollars and cents" evidence of 
such an impact. Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 149 N.E.2d 65, 67 (N.Y. 1958). 
197 See, e.g., Sheeley v. Levine, 538 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (App. Div. 1983) (upholding grant of 
variance where realtor offered property to 41 potential buyers). 
198 Crossroads Recreation, 149 N.E.2d at 67; see also Northern Westchester Profl. Park 
Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 458 N.E.2d 809, 814-15 (N.Y. 1983) (citing Crossroads, 149 N.E.2d 
at 65). But see Village Bd. of the Village of Fayetteville v. Jarrold, 423 N.E.2d 385, 389 (N.Y. 
1981) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (criticizing rigid application of Crossroads in denial of use 
variance). 
199 See Crossroads Recreation, 149 N.E.2d at 67. The factors comprise what could be a partial 
list of the factors that would go into an assessment of the reasonable use inquiry required in 
takings analysis. 
200 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 10 (1993). 
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unique to the subject property.201 The requirement reflects the fact 
that the variance is essentially an administrative mechanism. Finally, 
the requirement reflects the judiciary's acceptance of the fact that 
legislatively crafted zoning necessarily imposes burdens on land-
owners. The underlying rationale of the unique burden requirement 
is that where a zoning restriction imposes a burden on a number of 
similarly situated landowners, the proper remedy is a generally ap-
plicable amendment of the ordinance.202 Thus, courts must focus not 
only on the individual landowner but on the general impact of the 
regulation on similarly situated landowners. 
There is one type of exceptional case in which some courts have 
found the unique burden requirement met in circumstances that do 
not strictly satisfy the requirement. The typical case occurs where a 
property is surrounded by uses which cause the subject property to 
be unable to achieve a reasonable return without a variance.203 In 
these circumstances, some decisions have allowed a variance to issue 
so that the landowner may obtain a reasonable return.204 
The third Otto prong requires that a landowner show that the 
variance will not injure other landowners or undermine the purposes 
of the ordinance.205 Like the unique burden requirement, this require-
ment also looks to the nature of the regulation. Here, however, courts 
focus not so much on the impact, but on the purpose of the regulation 
and the interests and values sought to be protected. Courts are con-
sistently deferential to zoning's traditional purposes: protection of 
health and safety, and preservation of neighborhood character and 
values.206 The more directly related an ordinance's or a regulation's 
purposes are to tangible human health and safety impacts, the more 
weight courts give them and the greater the burden which courts will 
require an individual landowner to bear under the zoning scheme.207 
In assessing the variance's impact on the ordinance under the third 
Otto prong, courts look to the ends to be achieved through zoning and 
201 Courts have been willing to consider not just the land but improvements in this context. 
ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.37. Verbal formulations of the test frequently turn on a showing 
that the property is "uniquely burdened" or "peculiarly effected." 
202 Otto v. Steinhilber,24 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. 1939). 
203 See PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 43.02[4][i] (1994). 
204 See, e.g., Board of Adjustment v. Murphy, 591 So. 2d 505, 507 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (noted 
supra note 190). 
205 Otto, 24 N.E.2d at 853. 
206 Such tangible impacts as traffic and safety are paramount in courts' consideration. See 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting that 
zoning's setback and street dedication requirements are constitutional because they prevent 
traffic congestion); Bell Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Zoning Hearing Bd, 301 A.2d 436, 437-38 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (deferring to fear of pedestrian-auto hazard). 
207 Given the general judicial willingness to scrutinize local variance decisions, a reviewing 
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the means chosen to achieve such ends.208 Generally deferential to the 
goals and means of zoning, and mindful of how variances can singly 
and cumulatively prevent the zoning ordinance from achieving its 
aims, courts consistently deny variances to landowners. Landowners 
thus experience a significant constraint on their ability to use prop-
erty. At the same time, all property owners under the ordinance are 
believed to benefit from the advantages that flow from the zoning 
ordinance. 
C. Other Variance Caselaw Doctrine 
In addition to the three-part analysis under Otto, courts employ 
other doctrines to assess the appropriateness of a decision to grant or 
deny a zoning variance.209 The most pervasive of these doctrines is the 
self-created hardship, which is essentially an equitable doctrine.21o 
Courts typically apply self-created hardship rules in situations where 
the landowner has purchased with knowledge of zoning restrictions, 
or conveyed or subdivided property in such a way as to create a 
non-complying parcel.211 State zoning enabling statutes may them-
selves identify self-created hardship as an impermissible basis for 
granting a variance.212 Many state courts completely bar claims to a 
variance in such cases.213 On rare occasions, courts have granted a 
court assessing this prong of the test would probably be disposed not to second-guess a local 
body that has denied a variance based on its conclusion that the use would potentially hann the 
public. Conversely, courts appear to scrutinize conclusions that no hann will occur. In New 
Jersey, where the public hann prong is codified, the courts have spelled out in detail the inquiry 
that a board of adjustment must follow in assessing hann to the area. See Medici v. BPR Co., 
526 A.2d 109, 121-22 (N.J. 1987); Homes of Hope, Inc. v. Mount Holly Township, 566 A.2d 575, 
578 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989). 
208 See infra part IV.D. 
209 A common exception allows utilities to receive variances because they have no other 
reasonable use for the land and any negative effects of their activities on neighbors is out-
weighed by the overall community benefit. 
210 See, e.g., Aitken v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 557 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (stating 
general rule); Stotts v. Wright County, 478 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (charging 
landowner with knowledge of whether zoning ordinance allows construction). 
211 See, e.g., Elwyn v. City of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849, 852-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (explaining 
general rule and citing cases from other jurisdictions), em. denied, 116 So. 2d 773 (1959); 
Sanchez v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 488 So. 2d 1277, 1279-80 (La. Ct. App.), em. denied, 
491 So. 2d 24, and eert. denied, 479 U.S. 963 (1986); LeBlanc v. City of Barre, 477 A.2d 970 (Vt. 
1984). 
212 See, e.g., N.Y. ToWN LAW § 267-b (McKinney Supp. 1994). Under the New York statute, if 
a hardship is self-created, a zoning board must not grant a use variance, though it may grant 
an area variance. 
213 ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.44 n.12. 
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variance where a landowner has done no more than purchase with 
knowledge of a land-use restriction.214 
In applying the components of the hardship tests, courts focus 
primarily on the parcel, as opposed to the applicant. Accordingly, they 
consider unique physical features of the subject property that may 
cause the parcel to be unusable under the ordinance,215 but not pecu-
liar personal circumstances of the applicant.216 Variance applicants 
have generally been unsuccessful in raising arguments based on the 
fact that an adjacent property owner engages in the proposed use-
whether on a nonconforming status or on the basis of a variance-or 
that the property is near a district boundary.217 Courts have taken into 
account the effect of adjacent uses on the subject property's amena-
bility to permitted uses.218 
As noted above, in many states the standard governing issuance of 
area variances is lower than that governing use variances.219 The 
distinction has enabled variance-granting boards and reviewing 
courts to achieve some flexibility in the administration of zoning or-
dinances without threatening the zoning ordinance's use scheme. The 
most common standard, derived from the language of many ordi-
nances, allows an area variance to be granted upon a showing of 
"practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship."220 This standard 
reflects the general policy disfavoring use variances.221 Courts that 
have adopted dual standards generally did so on the grounds that 
rigorous enforcement of area requirements was not as essential to 
214 See, e.g., Chirichello v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 397 A.2d 646, 651 (N.J. 1979) (finding knowledge 
irrelevant because purchaser "stand[s] in shoes of predecessor[] in title"). 
215 See, e.g., Szelega Enter., Inc. v. Vestal, 320 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (App. Div. 1971) (upholding 
finding that thin topsoil made property unusable for certain permitted uses). 
216 See, e.g., St. Clair v. Skagit County, 715 P.2d 165, 168 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that 
evidence of hardship or difficulty must relate to land, not to owner-applicant). 
217 See, e.g., Taylor v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adj., 308 A.2d 230, 235 (D.C. 1973) 
(holding that proximity to boundary does not warrant variance, in a case involving a denial of 
a residential variance). 
218 See, e.g., Stevens. v. Town of Huntington, 229 N.E.2d 591, 594 (N.Y. 1967) (finding, over 
dissent, no reasonable use where predominantly commercial area was downzoned to residential); 
Valley View Civic Ass'n. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983). 
219 See supra note 157 and accompanying text; see also I vancovich v. City of Thcson Bd. of 
Adj., 529 P.2d 242, 250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (adopting lesser standard for area variance); Board 
of Adj. v. Kwik-Check Realty, Inc., 389 A.2d 1289, 1291 (Del. 1978) (offering rationale for dual 
standards); Matthew v. Smith, 707 S.W.2d 411, 414-16 (Mo. 1986) (discussing difference between 
use and area variances, examining language of enabling acts, and adopting lower standard for 
area variances). 
220 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 89.090 (Vernon 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-7-207(3) (1992). 
221 See Matthew, 707 S.W.2d at 416. 
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zoning's purpose as use variances.222 The dual standard is seen with 
varying degrees of clarity and explicitness in the caselaw.223 
Under a typical lowered standard, a landowner applying for an area 
variance generally must show that strict application of the restriction 
would result in economic injury. For example, New York courts have 
employed a less stringent test for area variances than for use vari-
ances.224 Under the test, a court looks to the economic impact on the 
landowner, the extent of the variance, the effect on the neighborhood, 
and whether the landowner could pursue alternative means.225 That 
the difficulty might have been self-imposed is also relevant.226 If the 
landowner shows that denial of the variance would simply cause eco-
nomic harm, the burden shifts to the municipality to show that appli-
cation is necessary to advance the purpose of the ordinance or prevent 
injury to the public.227 By contrast, some courts have been unwilling 
explicitly or categorically to lower the burden for granting area vari-
ances.228 This position is based on the recognition that area variances 
may in fact be more harmful than at least certain use variances to the 
integrity and purposes of a comprehensive plan. 
The fact that some courts and legislatures assess use and area 
variances differently reflects their appreciation for the underlying 
policies and purposes advanced by a zoning scheme. Thus, in review-
ing the grant of area variances, courts appear to display a more 
flexible approach in which they assess and weigh the types of factors 
articulated in the New York caselaw.229 Where the deviation from the 
ordinance is minimal and will not result in any significant impairment 
of the goals of the ordinance, courts may allow the grant of a variance. 
222 See, e.g., Ivancovich, 529 P.2d at 248; Kwik-Check Realty, 389 A.2d at 1291; Matthew, 707 
S.W.2d at 416. 
223 See ANDERSON, supra note 57, § 20.49. 
224 See Village of Bronxville v. Francis, 150 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div.) (adopting use-area 
distinction), aff'd, 135 N.E.2d 724 (1956); Wachsberger v. Michalis, 191 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 
1959) (suggesting criteria for area variance determination), aff'd, 238 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 
1963). The dual standards developed in the caselaw have been codified. N.Y. ToWN LAW § 267-b 
(McKinney Supp. 1994). 
22S Wachsberger, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 624. 
226 See supra notes 210--14 and accompanying text. 
227 See Fulling v. Palumbo, 233 N.E.2d 272, 274 (N.Y. 1967) (property owner who shows that 
denial would result in significant economic harm is entitled to relief unless municipality shows 
that ordinance serves public health, safety, and welfare), overruled in part by Doyle v. Amster, 
594 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1992). For a history of the difficulties New York courts experienced 
employing the distinction, see Erikson, supra note 182, at 796-803. 
228 See, e.g., Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of Adj., 247 N.W.2d 98, 102, 104 (Wis. 
1976) (finding no distinction between ''unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficulties" and 
rejecting lesser burden on applicant for area variance). 
229 See Wachsberger, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 624; supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
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If, however, the deviation is substantial and the potential for under-
mining the ordinance is deemed to be greater, courts are less likely 
to allow the variance.230 
Even where the use and area variance standards differ, courts 
employ still other doctrines to deny variances. Matters such as per-
sonal difficulties or inconvenience are generally insufficient to war-
rant either a use or an area variance. Similarly, if a hardship is deemed 
self-created, courts tend to treat an area variance application under 
rules as stringent as those applied for use variances.231 Courts do, 
however, find other means to meet unusual circumstances. For in-
stance, where the practical difficulty is related to a unique physical 
attribute of the land, an area variance is often allowed.232 
D. The Purposes of Zoning and Land-use Controls 
In their review of zoning variance decisions, courts are required to 
consider the purposes of the zoning ordinance. They must do so in 
order to assess the uniqueness of the burden on the applicant and 
other landowners and the potential impact of variances on neighbor-
hood character, the public interest, and the integrity of the zoning 
scheme. As we have seen, courts display substantial deference to the 
overall goals of zoning and the traditional means employed to attain 
them. Courts have acquiesced in the choice of means employed to 
achieve zoning's purposes-separation of incompatible uses-since 
Euclid. Courts have done so despite zoning's individual and aggregate 
burdens and potential unfair impact.233 Zoning's acceptance stems in 
part from its purported rationality and comprehensiveness, qualities 
which were originally touted as an improvement over the unpre-
dictable, ad hoc nuisance suit.234 
The history of judicial scrutiny of the proper objects of zoning since 
Euclid chronicles a gradual, though sometimes grudging, acceptance 
of zoning to achieve goals not directly or clearly related to health and 
230 See, e.g., Wolf v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adj., 397 A.2d 936, 941-43 (D.C. 1979). 
But see Gilmartin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adj., 579 A.2d 1164, 1172 (D.C. 1990) 
(rejecting and remanding grant of variance for parking where alternative means might have 
been available). Gilmartin also illustrates the sometimes blurred line between use and area 
variances. 
281 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
232 See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of N.H. & Vt. v. City of Concord, 451 A.2d 1315, 1317 (N.H. 1982) 
(finding fact that property was located in a less populated part of zone constituted a hardship 
arising from the uniqueness of the property, both the building and land). 
233 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police 
Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201, 252 (1974). 
234 See BABCOCK, supra note 176, at 4. 
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safety, usually under the power to promote the general welfare. Rec-
reational measures, for example, which are included in some enabling 
statutes, have gained acceptance.235 Aesthetically directed zoning has 
not fared as well,236 though the nexus between aesthetic regulation 
and safety237 and property values has helped sustain some aesthetic 
zoning restrictions.238 Courts have been more willing to uphold zoning 
enactments that aim to preserve "neighborhood character."239 In doing 
235 In fact, section 3 of the SSZEA, and most enabling acts, include provision of adequate parks 
among the proper purposes. See, for example, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 863.13 (West 1988), 
which specifically identifies provision of recreational facilities as a proper purpose. 
236 The tortuous path of judicial acceptance of zoning for "aesthetic" purposes is well chron-
icled. See, e.g., Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New 
General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603, 609-38 (1981). 
237 While early courts scoffed at the notion of zoning for aesthetics, some courts managed to 
find safety and health concerns provided a sturdy enough peg on which to hang approval of 
architectural requirements. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (building line 
requirements upheld based on purposes stated in SSZEA). 
23B See SSZEA, supra note 162, which lists preservation of property values as an object of 
zoning. See also Comment, Zoning for Aesthetics Substantially Reducing Property Values, 27 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 303 (1970). BABCOCK, supra note 176, finds a transformation of zoning's 
theoretical basis from protection of property value to advancement of planning values. Babcock 
criticizes slavish adherence to the master plan, which "enshrines" a set of static and narrow 
community goals. See BABCOCK, supra note 176, at 123. The economic justification for zoning, 
which posits a Pareto-optimal notion of maximization of aggregate value, is also questionable. 
See William C. Wheaton, Zoning and Land Use Planning: An Economic Perspective, in ZONING 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 319 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. 
Kayden eds. 1989). Compare Soble Construction Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of E. Stroudsburg, 
329 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (rejecting stabilization of property values as sufficient 
basis upon which to sustain denial of permit, where board denied permit on basis of effect on 
value of neighboring properties) with Saturley v. Hollis, 533 A.2d 29, 30 (N.H. 1987) (prohibiting 
grant of any variance that would diminish value of surrounding property). 
239 See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. East Hampton, 442 N.Y.S.2d 125, 129 (App. Div. 1981) 
(finding preservation of "natural and rural qualities" of an area are legitimate goals of zoning); 
Petersen v. Dane County, 402 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (zoning to preserve agricul-
tural character of area). The court in Curtiss-Wright may have been comforted by the fact that 
protection of water supplies provided a basis for the challenged ordinance. See 442 N. Y.S.2d at 
129. The lot-size cases also illustrate zoning to preserve character. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of 
Needham,42 N.E.2d 516, 518-19 (Mass. 1942) (displaying broad deference, despite skepticism, 
to municipal use of minimum lot sizes to promote general welfare). But see Aronson v. Town of 
Sharon, 195 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1964) (invalidating use of large-lot zoning where dominant 
purpose was to establish preserves without direct link to health or safety). The constitutional 
high-water mark of zoning to preserve character was reached in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U.S. 1 (1974), where the Court put its imprimatur on zoning to preserve "family values, 
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air." Village of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. 
at 9. Courts have subsequently subjected zoning ordinances that are alleged to interfere with 
civil rights-"exclusionary zoning"-to greater scrutiny. See the landmark case of Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Mt. Laurel!), 
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that local zoning enactments must reflect a broad 
concept of the general welfare. Though the court, in so holding, questioned the recitation of 
environmental purposes as justification for zoning that has exclusionary effects, the court 
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so, courts have recognized that zoning stabilizes the expectations of 
landowners, whose property values depend on the zoning restric-
tions.240 
Localities began to incorporate comprehensive modern environ-
mental protection measures into land-use ordinances in the 1970s.241 
The legal framework was, however, already in place. In fact, one 
commentator finds that Justice Sutherland's opinion in Euclid reflects 
a concern for a broad range of environmental planning concerns that 
can be constitutionally pursued through legislation.242 Environmental 
land-use planning,243 and protection and conservation of natural re-
sources, have been among the legitimate purposes that courts have 
sanctioned under the zoning power and through local ordinances and 
regulations at least since the 1972 case of Just v. Marinette County.244 
In Just, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a shoreland zoning 
ordinance against a facial takings challenge.245 The court's reasoning 
incorporated the MugZer "noxious use" concept.246 Since Just, courts 
have generally sustained zoning-based regulations to protect sensi-
tive areas and to limit construction in unsuitable areas such as flood-
plains and steep slopes.247 Statewide, resource-specific programs are 
ultimately strongly affirmed the propriety of environmental controls. Mt. Laurel I, 337 A.2d at 
731; see infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text. 
240 This point was not lost on the Otto court. See Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 
(N.Y. 1939). 
241 Indeed, zoning's failure to protect ecological resources has fueled arguments for regional, 
state, and federal land-use regulation. MASON, supra note 5, at 36-37; see also Arthur E. Palmer, 
Environmentally Based Land Use Planning and Regulation, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 63 
(1984). 
242 See Earl Finbar Murphy, Euclid and the Environment, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN 
DREAM, supra note 238, at 154, 156. Murphy argues that Euclid embraced a sufficiently broad 
concept of the "environment" to encompass not just the built environment (a concern seen in 
the opinion's characterization of apartment buildings as "parasites"), but natural amenities such 
as light, open space, and air. Id. at 159. 
243 The term refers to the approach to land-use planning which attempts to objectively identify 
natural constraints on development and steer development toward the most appropriate areas. 
See IAN McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969), a seminal work in the field of environmental 
land-use planning. 
244 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). The ordinance did allow a variance where changes to the 
resource would not inflict harm, though the court did not rely on it in upholding the ordinance. 
For a brief case study of the transition from traditional zoning to "environmentally based" 
zoning, see Palmer, supra note 241. For a more critical view of recent changes in land-use law, 
see MASON, supra note 5, at 36-38. 
245 Just, 201 N.W.2d at 772. Just is also significant for its incorporation of public trust concepts 
into private property ownership. See id. at 768. 
246 See Cunningham, supra note 181, § 9.21, at 616. 
247 See, e.g., Franchise Developers v. City of Cincinnati, 505 N.E.2d 966, 971 (Ohio 1987) 
(sustaining municipal use of overlay zoning to protect sensitive environmental areas). 
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frequently administered at the local level through the existing zoning 
apparatus.248 Indeed, the use of zoning as an administrative vehicle 
for environmental based land-use controls has been reinforced as local 
authorities are increasingly required to adopt a regional perspective 
in zoning enactments.249 
Zoning restrictions to protect health and safety and to preserve and 
enhance neighborhood value and character-the urban and suburban 
environment-are a common feature on the legal landscape. While 
some of the more intangible goals that localities have sought through 
zoning have not gained universal acceptance, courts recognize the 
broad range of community goals that are properly within zoning's 
ambit. Thus, in reviewing a variance decision, they accordingly weigh 
such purposes carefully in determining whether the proposed vari-
ance will be injurious to the public or will undermine the purposes of 
the ordinance. 
V. THE VARIANCE IN LAND-USE BASED ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROLS 
Legislators have recognized the wisdom of implementing land-use 
based environmental controls through the existing system of zon-
ing.250 Rather than create programs that are implemented primarily 
at the state or regional level, lawmakers have often provided for the 
integration of environmental resource-protective requirements into 
pre-existing, locally administered, zoning ordinances.251 Land-use 
based environmental controls implemented in this way thereby arrive 
swaddled in the familiar cloth of zoning. 
When variance decisions under such programs are appealed, courts 
have tended to frame decisions much as they have in traditional 
zoning cases. In the process, courts have begun selectively to incor-
porate and refine the extensive body of caselaw developed in the 
traditional zoning context in considering the propriety of a variance 
or permit denial in environmental land-use controls.252 
248 See infra part V.A.l. 
249 See generally Michael F. Reilly, Transfarmation at Work: The Effect of Environmental 
Law on Land Use Control, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 33 (1989). 
250 PLATER, supra note 132, at 974. Similarly, Professor Tribe suggests that the fact that the 
restrictions in Agins v. Tiburon were contained in a zoning ordinance may have saved them. 
TRIBE, supra note 25, § 9.4. 
251 See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text. 
252 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State, 479 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 1984) (import-
ing zoning variance requirement that landowner must prove, by "dollars and cents" evidence, 
economic impact of restriction). 
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Not all land-use based environmental controls are implemented 
through pre-existing zoning structures. Land-use controls and permit 
and variance procedures are also found in such programs as wetland 
protection acts, coastal zone management programs, dune protection 
programs, critical or sensitive area protection, floodplain provisions, 
and regional protection programs.253 The primary administering 
authority may exist at the federal, state, county, or regional levels, or 
at multiple levels. Accordingly, the substantive provisions and admin-
istrative structure of the programs vary widely.254 Courts have also 
tended to review decisions under these programs in a manner similar 
to that employed in traditional zoning cases. 
A. Adminstration and Standards Governing the Variance 
1. Adminstration and Procedures 
Variance procedures may be specified in the governing statute or 
regulations of a state-administered program.255 Where the program 
provides for local government administration,256 such as implementa-
tion through zoning, the procedure may be found in the state's zoning 
enabling statute.257 The variance-granting body may be designated as 
the local zoning appeals body258 or a state-level body created under 
the governing statute.259 Where a local body is authorized to grant 
variances, a state-level entity may have the power to review its 
decisions for compliance with substantive standards and consistency 
with the regulatory purposes.260 
253 For a survey of such measures, see NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TION OF REAL PROPERTY (1993), especially sections 5, 11, and 13. 
264 Most common are use-triggered review and permit procedures that incorporate use- and 
area-based rules. These limitations and restrictions may consist of performance standards tied 
to natural conditions, as in some wetland or dune protection statutes. The program may take 
the form of use regulations that apply across a region, such as in New York's Adirondack Park 
or New Jersey's Pine Barrens. An extensive discussion of the variety of regulatory provisions 
is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
255 See, e.g., New York Tidal Wetlands Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0602 
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1994). 
255 See, e.g., Connecticut Coastal Management Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-105, 22a-
109 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). 
267 Wisconsin's shoreland zoning, which imposes setbacks around certain waterbodies and 
wetlands, takes this approach. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 61.351 (West. 1988) (imposing shoreland 
zoning requirements in villages); [d. at § 62.23(e) (authorizing boards of appeals to grant vari-
ances). 
268 This is the case under the Wisconsin statutes cited supra note 257. 
269 See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. §§ 25-0402 (McKinney 1984) (provisions under New York 
Tidal Wetlands Act); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-120.1 (1992) (provisions under North Carolina 
Coastal Area Management Act). 
260 For example, the Connecticut Coastal Management Act requires local governments to 
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Often, environmental controls are permit based, thus the variance 
may consist of the power to modify permit criteria. For example, 
provisions may authorize the decisionmaking body to vary, modify, or 
waive the permitting criteria upon a specified showing by the appli-
cant.261 Aggrieved applicants, as well as abutters or other interested 
parties, normally have recourse to judicial appeal of the body's deci-
sion. Such procedures generally envision a more active role for the 
variance body, and provide for greater administrative flexibility than 
may exist where the power is merely to grant or deny a variance. 
2. Variance Standards and Criteria 
The variance standards and criteria reflect the administrative 
structure of the particular scheme. There are two common types of 
criteria: hardship standards similar to those used in zoning, and ex-
plicit anti-takings standards. 
Hardship standards are typically employed where the restrictions 
and limitations are built into local zoning. The criteria will normally 
be the same as under the zoning ordinance.262 As with zoning criteria, 
these standards generally adhere to the constitutional safety-valve 
purpose and may incorporate caselaw refinements.263 Even where the 
variance is governed by provisions apart from those governing zon-
ing, the variance standards are still usually similar. For example, the 
New Jersey Freshwater Wetlands Act requires a waiver if necessary 
to avoid a substantial hardship to the applicant caused by circum-
stances peculiar to the property.264 Similarly, the criteria in the North 
implement the Act's provisions consistently with statewide policies. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22a-104 (West 1985). Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act provides for beach and shore 
preservation on a local or county basis, but allows variances only with state approval. FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 161.053(4) (West 1990). 
261 Connecticut Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-36 to 
-45 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994). The local variance review board may grant a permit with any 
terms, conditions, limitations, or modifications. [d. § 22a-42a(d). 
262 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7) (West 1988) (authorizing city boards of appeals to grant 
special exceptions); [d. at § 62.231 (requiring cities to enact shoreland zoning of wetlands). 
263 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-18 (West 1991) (incorporating uniqueness requirement). 
264 [d. at § 13:9B-18(a) (West 1991). Compare New Jersey's zoning variance standard, which 
authorizes the grant of variance on the basis of unique physical conditions or "extraordinary 
and exceptional" conditions that would result in ''peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties" 
or "exceptional and undue hardship." Use variances are explicitly barred. And variances must 
not result in substantial detriment to the public good or substantial impairment of the intent 
and purpose of the plan and ordinance. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70 (West Supp. 1993). Similarly 
strict are the variance criteria under Ohio's Lake Erie coastal management program. The 
criteria require, among other conditions, that an applicant suffer "exceptional hardship" before 
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Carolina Coastal Area Management Act are based on those in the 
state's zoning enabling act.265 '!\vo of the three prongs under the North 
Carolina Act parallel the Otto criteria, and the third reinforces the 
legislative nature of generally applicable land-use rules. The test 
allows the Coastal Commission to vary restrictions if the applicant 
satisfies the following three-part test: (1) practical difficulties or un-
necessary hardship would result from strict application; (2) the 
difficulty or hardship would result from conditions "peculiar" to the 
property; and (3) the conditions could not reasonably have been an-
ticipated when the restrictions were adopted or amended.266 
In contrast to traditional zoning's focus on land uses generically, 
many environmental programs employ specific performance criteria 
which a developer must meet in order to obtain a permit. These 
programs may not separately authorize a variance per se, but rather 
may allow the permit-granting body to vary the performance criteria 
if necessary. Such a procedure may also reflect a legislative judgment 
that the devise is to operate primarily as a tool to provide adminis-
trative flexibility, rather than as a constitutional safety valve. Thus, 
the criteria may direct the decisionmaking body to consider a broad 
range of factors, which the body must weigh in its discretion.267 
As in many zoning ordinances,268 the statute may limit discretion by 
directing the board, or a reviewing court, to deny a variance or other 
relief to avoid harming the public.269 This requirement is particularly 
common where the potential harms posed by the regulated activity 
are direct and clear, as in the case of ordinances regulating construc-
tion in floodplains.270 Where the potential harm is less tangible, the 
criteria may require consideration of the underlying public interests 
an exception to normal permit process may be granted. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.07(B) 
(Baldwin 1990). 
265 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-120.1 (1989). 
266 [d. 
267 For example, New York's Coastal Erosion Hazard Areas Act regulations allow the depart-
ment of environmental conservation to modify permit requirements if the applicant demon-
strates that (1) no reasonable, prudent, alternative site is available; (2) the applicant has included 
all responsible means and measures to mitigate adverse impacts on resources; (3) the develop-
ment will be reasonably safe from flood-erosion damage; and (4) the variance sought is the 
minimum necessary. N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 505.13 (1992). 
268 See supra notes 174-75,205-08 and accompanying text. 
269 This may occur whether the particular procedure is a variance or special permit. 
270 For example, the statute governing Arizona's floodplain regulations directs the local board 
to adopt variance procedures that will deny variances that could result in danger or damage. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-3609(B)(7) (West 1988). 
348 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:307 
in natural resource values.271 Public harm provisions are also seen in 
many zoning variance standards.272 
While takings concerns underlie virtually all variance procedures, 
some procedures expressly employ an "anti-takings" standard. Such 
a standard requires the variance-granting body to consider the pos-
sibility that a variance denial will constitute a taking. In some cases, 
the standard directs that the variance must be granted where appli-
cation would constitute a taking.273 New York's tidal wetlands law 
adopts a middle ground. The law instructs a reviewing court that finds 
a permit denial constitutes a taking to allow the administering agency 
to grant the permit or acquire the property rights found to have been 
taken.274 Such a provision raises issues regarding "temporary tak-
ings," in particular, the issues of when precisely the compensation 
period begins and what constitutes non-compensable "normal" admin-
istrative delay.275 These issues remain unsettled.276 
Anti-takings standards, and other standards that explicitly address 
the possibility of a regulatory taking, reflect the ad hoc character of 
regulatory takings law.277 Such standards typically provide little sub-
stantive guidance as to precisely when a variance-granting body or 
reviewing court is to find that a taking has occurred. However, some 
271 N.Y. CaMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 661.11(a). A variance under New York's tidal 
wetland regulations must not have an "undue adverse impact" on tidal wetland values, must 
observe the spirit and intent of the act, secure the public safety and welfare, and do substantial 
justice. But the standard incorporates a "practical difficulties" test and allows a variance where 
strict application would be contrary to the purposes of the act, thus suggesting that the test is 
not overly stringent. [d.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-ll (West 1991) (identifying factors 
to determine if an activity proposed near freshwater wetland is in the public interest). 
272 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
273 The proposed Massachusetts River Protection Act would take this approach. See Massa-
chusetts River Protection Act, S.B. 1620, 1993 Reg. Sess. § 3, § 4(b) (1993) [hereinafter MRPAj. 
The statute may require a reviewing court to order the agency or municipality to order the 
variance issued where a would-be taking is found. See id. Under various state acts, if a reviewing 
court determines that a taking has occurred, the court must order the regulator to compensate 
the owner for the lost value, purchase the property, or modify its acts to minimize the detri-
mental affect on the property's value. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6613 (1991). On the 
potential use of an administrative takings variance, see Jonathan S. Klavens, At the Edge of 
Environmental Adjudication: An Administrative Takings Variance, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
277 (1994) (urging legislature, courts, and agencies to provide for and sustain use of administra-
tive takings variance in large statewide environmental programs). 
274 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 25-0404 (McKinney 1984). 
275 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 
(1987); see Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1992) (entertaining claim that 
administrative delay constituted temporary taking where complaint alleges that delay caused 
total destruction of property). 
276 See generally LaRusso, supra note 149. 
277 See supra section III. 
1995] VARIANCE 349 
standards attempt to define the baseline, that is, the appropriate 
measure of the property that forms the pre-diminution value for 
purposes of assessing the economic effect of a regulation.278 
A related procedure, which incidentally demonstrates the difficulty 
of articulating categorical takings or takings formulas, is the takings 
impact analysis (TIA). TIAs require regulators to assess the impact 
of their actions on property owners' interests, and to refrain from 
regulatory actions that would constitute takings. The executive 
branch has thus either required,279 or been required to conduct,280 such 
analyses. But while a predictable takings formula would be welcome 
by the planning and regulatory community,281 and while some com-
mentators have suggested useful formulations,282 categorical takings 
remain limited to physical invasions and deprivations of all economi-
cally beneficial use.283 
278 See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text. These legislative efforts reflect the orien-
tation of their sponsors toward government control of land use. A bill introduced in Florida 
would have adopted a conceptual severance approach, effectively denying Penn Central, and 
expanding the scope of takings by directing that the economic impact of a restriction be based 
on the regulation's effect only on the restricted portion of a landowner's property. See H.B. 1437 
(1993). Such an approach does not examine the reasonableness of uses that remain and disre-
gards the purpose of a land-use restriction. The MRPA by contrast, incorporates zoning princi-
ples and would require that economic hardship be assessed in relation to the value of the entire 
parcel and any adjacent parcel the petitioner owns or has an option to purchase. MRPA, supra 
note 273, §§ 3, 4(b). 
279 See Charles R. Wise, The Changing Doctrine of Regulatory Takings and the Executive 
Branch, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 403 (1992) (critiquing federal Executive Order No. 12630, which 
required agencies to conduct takings impact analyses and finding that its government-wide 
approach to takings law could result in greater confusion than currently exists, because articu-
lation and definition of standards governing such factors as investment backed expectations and 
definition of baseline, which require policy judgments, are lacking). 
280 A few state efforts have required the attorney general to issue guidance for identifying 
potential takings. Arizona has enacted an especially restrictive review statute. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 37-221 to -223 (West 1993). The statute instructs the Attorney General to adopt 
guidelines to ensure that proposed health and safety measures are closely tailored to the threat 
to health and safety and are processed expeditiously. [d. at § 37-222. State agencies must 
prepare assessments of takings implications including the likelihood that an action may consti-
tute a taking, alternatives to the proposed action that might reduce the risk, and an estimate 
of the cost to the agency, including the source of payment from within the agency's budget, if a 
taking is found. [d. at § 37-223(B). Prior to taking an action restricting property use, the agency 
must document the risk created by the use, that the action substantially advances the public 
health and safety, that the restrictions are proportionate, and the potential cost if a taking is 
found. [d. at § 37-223(C). 
281 See, e.g., Eric Damian Kelly, A Challenge to Planners: Solve the Takings Problem, LAND 
USE L., Sept. 1993, at 3, 4--5 (urging legislators to define when a regulation "goes too far"). 
282 See, e.g., James J. Brown, Takings: Who Says it Needs to be So Confusing?, 22 STETSON 
L. REV. 379 (1993). 
283 See supra section III. 
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B. Judicial Treatment of the Environmental Land-use Variance 
The number of cases in which courts have considered the propriety 
of the grant or denial of a variance in cases involving land-use based 
environmental controls is limited. Those courts that have reviewed 
such variance decisions have mostly recognized that environmentally 
based restrictions embody broad public interests that also underlie 
traditional zoning ordinances. Faced with arguments that setbacks 
and use restrictions should not be enforced if doing so would curtail 
a landowner's use of his or her property, these courts have respected 
the basic legitimacy of environmental controls rooted in protection of 
the public health, safety, and welfare. In so doing, these courts have 
begun to make explicit the connection between the traditional zoning 
variance and the variance in land-use based environmental controls. 
They have also begun to incorporate the law of zoning variances into 
their decisions. The prevailing judicial approach thus far treats envi-
ronmentally based variance requests similarly to those under tradi-
tional zoning. This is particularly the case where the restrictions are 
implemented through a local zoning ordinance or other local ordi-
nance. 
1. The Underlying Connection: The Public Interest in Zoning and 
Environmental Protection 
The underlying issue of whether environmental controls, such as 
natural resource-based setbacks and use conditions, should be treated 
similarly to traditional local zoning restrictions has been explicitly 
addressed. In Chirichello v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court specifically considered the issue of whether 
environmentally based zoning restrictions should be assessed differ-
ently than traditional zoning restrictions.284 The court discussed the 
relation of the variance to the purposes of zoning.285 It stated that the 
zoning variance decision involves a discretionary weighing of the 
public interest, the interest of the landowner, and of nearby land-
owners.286 The court observed that a deprivation of all use of property 
under a zoning restriction amounts to a taking.287 But, the court 
284 397 A.2d 646, 652-53 (N.J. 1979). Cf State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) 
(distinguishing a statewide wetland protection measure, which secures a benefit to the entire 
state, from "conventional zoning for town protection," and finding taking of property where, in 
absence of permit, land was "commercially valueless") (emphasis added). 
285 Chirichello, 397 A.2d 652-53. 
286 [d. at 652. 
287 [d. at 652-53. 
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opined, a different, more demanding, calculus might apply in the case 
of certain environmental land-use controls: where environmental con-
trols protect widespread and important public interests, a deprivation 
of all use may not require that a variance be granted.288 The 
Chirichello court's view that total deprivations of use do not require 
compensation is perhaps less likely to gain adherents in a post-Lucas 
world. Nonetheless, the decision is noteworthy for making explicit the 
importance of the goals of environmental land-use controls. Even 
more important is the decision's recognition that environmental con-
trols may protect interests at least as broadly-rooted in the public 
health, safety, and welfare as the interests that have long supported 
traditional zoning controls. 
2. Environmental Protection Cases Explicitly Importing Zoning 
Caselaw 
As more cases presenting questions about the grant or denial of a 
variance in the environmental land-use context have emerged, other 
courts have begun to explicitly note the connection between environ-
mental controls and traditional zoning. In a 1993 case, Strafach v. 
Durfee, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted this connection in 
considering the application of a variance standard contained in state 
regulations that governed environmentally sensitive coastal areas.289 
Regulations of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Man-
agement (DEM) required minimum setbacks from the high water 
mark for sewage disposal systems located in areas that were desig-
nated as prone to erosion under Rhode Island's coastal management 
program.290 The landowner sought a variance in order to install a 
septic system to service a proposed commercial development on an 
oceanfront property.291 The regulations authorized the Agency to 
grant a variance upon a showing of unnecessary hardship.292 The DEM 
denied the request, but the trial court reversed.293 The supreme court 
addressed the propriety of the trial court's reversal. In so doing, the 
288 Id. at 653 (citing AMG Associates v. Township of Springfield, 319 A.2d 705, 711 n.4 (N.J. 
1974) (noting that in zoning variance context, "vital ecological and environmental considera-
tions" that have lead to land-use restrictions to protect public interests "wide in scope and 
territory," such as coastal wetlands protection, may require a different calculus». 
289 635 A.2d 277 (R.I. 1993). 
290 See id. at 279. 
291 I d. at 278. 
292 Specifically, the regulations required that the applicant show that "literal enforcement of 
the rules will result in unnecessary hardship, and that a variance will not be contrary to the 
public interest and the public health." See id. at 280. 
293 I d. at 279-80. 
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court noted that the DEM's hearing officer did not reach the question 
of hardship, instead basing the denial on the failure of the variance 
applicant to satisfy the public interest and public health prongs of the 
standard.294 The court found that the trial court had erroneously based 
its decision not on a finding of hardship, but on a finding that the 
landowner "experienced more than a mere inconvenience."295 The 
DEM advanced the position that the regulation's unnecessary hard-
ship standard required that there be a deprivation of all beneficial use 
of the parcel before a variance could issue.296 But the court, citing 
shortcomings in the record, reserved the question of the proper ap-
plication of the unnecessary hardship standard in the context of an 
environmental program.297 
Strafach v. Durfee illustrates an instance in which there is a rela-
tively clear connection between protection of public health and safety 
and a regulation that on its face is responsive to "environmental" 
concerns. Septic system regulations typically are a relatively non-con-
troversial health-based aspect of zoning and subdivision regulations. 
Minimum lot-size requirements for individual sewage systems are a 
common feature of local zoning ordinances. However, as happened in 
this case, a state or regional program may also include such require-
ments.298 Where, however, such requirements become more closely 
tailored to prevailing natural conditions, the potential for landowners 
to object to what appears to be a unique burden increases. In addition, 
where the regional program is more stringent than the local ordi-
nance, fertile ground for claims of regulatory takings, based on per-
ceived unfairness, may exist. Nonetheless, the standard for granting 
a variance from the regional program should be assessed under simi-
lar principles as apply in the zoning context.299 Regulations that pro-
tect public interests by tailoring performance criteria to natural con-
ditions have at least as great a claim to enforcement as traditional 
zoning restrictions. The DEM's position that the unnecessary hard-
294 [d. at 283. 
295 [d. 
296 [d. 
297 [d. The variance applicant had apparently not adduced evidence of a hardship at the agency 
hearing. 
298 A recent New York case involved regulations under a regional groundwater protection 
program that were more stringent than those under local zoning. See Kierni Construction Corp. 
v. Suffolk County Dep't of Health Serv., 607 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1994). 
299 See, e.g., id. at 55 (affirming denial of variance under county groundwater management 
program where landowner sought to construct second dwelling on parcel, which would be 
allowed under local zoning, because the landowner was able to obtain a reasonable return on its 
investment and the economic value of the property was not destroyed). 
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ship standard requires a deprivation of all beneficial use before a 
variance should issue is a proper application of longstanding zoning 
caselaw in an environmental land-use context. 
Other cases have shown how courts may weigh the public interest 
heavily in variance decisions that involve potential environmental 
harm with a close connection to protection of public health. For ex-
ample, the clear public interest in protection against pollution of 
drinking water supplies weighed heavily in the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma in Eason Oil Co. v. Uhls.3°O Oklahoma City 
had designated certain areas of the city "nondrilling" zones.301 The 
plaintiff sought and was denied an application to engage in oil and gas 
well drilling.302 The denial was based on the potential threat to the 
city's water supply.303 The court held that the "reasonable probability" 
that the water supply might be contaminated was of sufficient gravity 
to warrant a denial of the variance on the grounds of contrariness to 
the public interest.304 Here, the particular restrictions are nearly iden-
tical to traditional zoning restrictions. Nonetheless, the case shows 
that the denial of a variance under a less traditional program that 
seeks to protect the public interest in natural resources should not 
pose a difficult question. 
In addition to recognizing the importance of such specific, perform-
ance-based, and clearly health-related measures, courts have also 
noted the validity of comprehensive, generally applicable, natural 
resource-protective environmental land-use restrictions. The under-
lying connection to zoning lies in the legislature's comprehensive iden-
tification of broad classifications for applicability of general use re-
strictions and performance criteria, such as minimum buildable area 
requirements and setbacks. As in zoning, even though the harm of a 
single variance is not obvious, the simple desire of a landowner to do 
whatever he or she wants is an insufficient reason to deviate from a 
comprehensive plan to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 
A recent case from Maryland, North v. St. Mary's County, is illus-
trative. This case involved a seemingly innocuous proposal under a 
geographically broad critical area protection program.305 The owner 
of the property at issue applied for a use variance to build on a 4.3-acre 
parcel of land which had been designated as a critical area pursuant 
300 518 P.2d 50, 52 (Okla. 1974). 
301 The ordinances had previously been sustained against constitutional objections. [d. at 50. 
302 [d. at 52. 
303 [d. 
304 [d. 
300 638 A.2d 1175, 1176 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). 
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to Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical Area legislation.3OO The land-
owner sought to construct a gazebo, which was an unpermitted use 
under the county's program, and the county board of appeals granted 
the variance.307 The Chairman of the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area 
Commission appealed.308 
The land-use restrictions enacted under the Chesapeake Bay pro-
gram have encountered criticism. But, the court reminded the parties, 
its function was not to review the legislation or the county program 
implementing it, including the terms of the variance standard.309 
Rather, the court's function was to assess, under a "fairly debatable" 
standard, the county board's decision to grant the variance.310 The 
court looked to Maryland zoning caselaw, under which a variance 
requires a showing of unnecessary hardship and practical difficulties, 
as well as a showing that the variance is required for reasonable use, 
meaning that the hardship must be the equivalent of a constitutional 
taking.311 The critical areas ordinance at issue employed a different, 
multi-part variance standard, including an "unwarranted hardship" 
requirement.312 The court agreed with the landowner that the ordi-
nance was sufficiently strict to have prevented Thoreau from building 
his hut.313 This was, of course, beside the point. The proper focus of 
the inquiry was the landowner's use of his entire four-acre holding. 
The property already featured the landowner's 1,100 square-foot 
home, outbuildings, and appurtenances, including a dock.314 "Thus," 
held the court, "the property already is subject to a reasonable use."315 
Finally, the court noted, while there was minimal evidence that the 
proposed gazebo would cause environmental damage, there was no 
evidence of an unwarranted hardship, or that the variance would not 
constitute a special privilege.316 As in the traditional zoning case, the 
proper remedy in the absence of a unique burden is a legislative 
306 [d. 
307 [d. 
308 See id. at 1177-78. 
309 [d. at 1176. 
310 [d. at 1176, 1178, 1184. 
311 [d. at 1179-80 (discussing Anderson v. Board of Appeals, Town of Chesapeake Beach, 322 
A.2d 220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974». 
312 [d. at 1180. The ordinance required that the board find (1) special circumstances, and 
unwarranted hardship without the variance; (2) deprivation ofthe landowner's "common" rights 
without the variance; (3) absence of special privilege if the variance is granted; (4) that the 
variance request is not based on a self-created circumstances; and (5) that the variance will not 
have an adverse environmental impact. [d. 
313 [d. at 1180 n.5. 
314 [d. at 1176, 1182. 
316 [d. at 1182. 
316 [d. at 1183. 
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change in the general use restrictions, not a case-by-case ad hoc set 
of administrative or judicial exceptions.3l7 The Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals thus recognized that variance decisions under envi-
ronmental land-use controls are adjudged under the same principles 
and caselaw as zoning and should pose no greater difficulty than cases 
that arise in the traditional zoning context. 
Where the nexus between the environmental controls and public 
health is less clear, and where a restriction is based on less tangible 
values, the variance decision may raise more difficult problems. A 
recent case from Indiana, Toum of Beverly Shores v. Bagnall, is illus-
trative.3l8 In this case, promotion of the general welfare through a 
dune preservation ordinance formed the basis for denial of a variance. 
The town of Beverly Shores, Indiana, passed an ordinance to preserve 
the sand dunes adjacent to Lake Michigan.319 The variance standard 
under the ordinance authorized a variance where practical difficulties 
existed and where the variance would neither injure the public nor 
affect adjacent property in a substantially adverse manner.320 The 
Indiana Court of Appeals labelled the local variance board's finding 
that destruction of a sand dune would be injurious to the public 
"vague" and insufficient to sustain the denial of a variance.32l On 
appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court viewed the matter differently. 
Though the court opined that there was no connection between the 
ordinance's restrictions on destruction of the dunes and the public 
health and safety, the court did find that the damage that the appli-
cant's proposed excavation would have caused to the dune would be 
injurious to the public welfare.322 
Where land-use restrictions are closely tied to a unique resource 
that is not widely distributed geographically, the burden on the land-
owner may appear to constitute a unique burden attributable to the 
land itself, thus suggesting satisfaction of Otto's uniqueness require-
ment. Measures linked to particular natural features thus carry the 
appearance of unfair impact on a small number of landowners. N one-
317 See supra notes 200--02 and accompanying text. 
318 590 N.E.2d 1059, 1062 (Ind. 1992). 
319Id. The stated purposes of the ordinance were "conservation of natural contours, vegeta-
tion, wild life and all the scenic qualities of the area of the sand dunes and all associated and 
related geographical elements which are so unique and valuable to the balance of nature." Id. 
The ordinance contained a series of mitigating performance requirements. Id. 
320 Id. at 1063. 
321 Town of Beverly Shores v. Bagnall, 570 N.E.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 
590 N.E.2d 1059 (1992). The trial court judge believed that the finding of no practical difficulty 
''border[ed] upon being ludicrous." See Beverly Shores 570 N.E.2d at 1367. 
322 Id. In so doing, the court quoted Carl Sandburg, who wrote admiringly of the dunes. 
Beverly Shores, 590 N.E.2d at 1061 n.2. 
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theless, such natural feature-specific restrictions must be assessed in 
view of their general applicability to similarly situated landowners. 
Where the controls are instituted pursuant to a regional or state-wide 
program, the legitimacy of such measures is generally strengthened. 
It should be noted, however, that such measures may reflect political, 
economic, and social considerations in addition to their more purely 
ecological bases. Such measures thus may have a more explicit redis-
tributive component than their strictly environmental and health-
and-safety based counterparts. 
3. A Cautionary Tale: Environmental Protection Cases 
Misapplying Zoning Caselaw 
Wholesale importation and application of traditional zoning vari-
ance doctrine to environmental land-use cases is not necessarily ap-
propriate. A key premise underlying traditional zoning-in particular, 
that preservation of neighborhood character warrants the imposition 
of use restrictions-does not translate directly into environmental 
land-use cases. The problem may occur where the ordinance seeks to 
preserve an intricate, pervasive, and perhaps invisible, but ultimately 
more tangible resource than character, such as groundwater. An un-
derlying tension between adherence to the principles that support 
zoning's restrictions and antagonism to environmental land-use re-
strictions may be apparent. 
The underlying tension is evident in the majority opinion and a 
dissenting opinion in a recent case that arose in the state of Maine, 
Perrin v. Town of Kittery.323 The case concerned a denial of a variance 
from a wetland setback provision of a local zoning ordinance. The 
Perrins built a home on a two-acre lot and then subdivided the lot into 
two one-acre lots.324 The Perrins next applied for a permit to build a 
second dwelling, but the application was denied based on proximity 
to the wetland. The Perrins sought and were denied a variance.325 The 
statutory variance standard followed the Otto test, and incorporated 
a self-created hardship provision.326 On appeal, the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court, applying its "well-established" rules, found that the 
323 591 A.2d 861, 862-63 (Me. 1991). 
324 [d. at 862. 
326 [d. at 862-63. 
326 [d. at 863. The requirements for a variance are set out under the state enabling statute. 
They are reasonable return, uniqueness, and no alteration of "essential character of locality." In 
addition, self-created hardships-hardships that are the ''result of action taken by the applicant 
or a prior owner"-are excluded. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, § 4353(4) (West 1992). 
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Perrins had not met the burden of showing that no reasonable return 
was possible.327 In crafting its decision, the court looked to zoning 
when it relied, in part, on the fact that the variance applicant owned, 
and lived on, the abutting lot.328 A dissenting opinion objected to this 
aspect of the majority's decision. The dissenting justice argued that 
under zoning law principles, only where an owner of contiguous non-
conforming lots can combine the lots and thereby meet physical stand-
ards maya variance be granted.329 Further, argued the justice, grant-
ing the variance could not possibly alter the character of the 
neighborhood.330 The applicant's hardship was simply not self-created 
within the statute's meaning.33l 
The dissenting justice's point regarding the character of the neigh-
borhood is an inappropriate importation of zoning doctrine into envi-
ronmentalland-use law. This test, the third Otto prong, is primarily 
concerned with the underlying purposes of traditional zoning and 
potential public harm.332 The dissent misconstrues the purpose of this 
aspect of the variance test. While a wetland variance may not disturb 
the character of the neighborhood in the traditional sense of introduc-
ing a different use, the variance may disturb the natural features of 
an area. More importantly, granting such variances ultimately fails to 
adequately protect the public health and welfare. Thus, the applicant 
for a variance in a case such as this fails to satisfy the unique burden 
requirement. 
Tension may arise when traditional zoning principles are introduced 
in the environmental context, as a recent Florida case illustrates. In 
Vatalaro v. Department of Environmental Regulation, the Florida 
District Court of Appeal found that a permit denial amounted to a 
regulatory taking where the denial left the owner with only passive 
recreational uses of a property upon which she intended to construct 
two dwellings.333 In order to refute the Department's argument that 
the hardship, if it existed, was self-created, the court attempted to 
distinguish between self-created hardships under traditional zoning 
327 Perrin, 591 A.2d at 863-64. 
328 [d. 
329 [d. at 865 (Brody, J., dissenting). 
330 [d. at 866 (Brody, J., dissenting). 
331 [d. 
332 See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text. 
333 601 So. 2d 1223, 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Approximately half of the l1-acre parcel 
was part of a lake. It is not entirely clear from the decision whether the agency argued that it 
might have issued the permit had the landowner submitted alternate plans. The court thus may 
have bypassed the finality issue. See supra note 112. 
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variance applications and permit denials.334 The court found that an 
owner who purchases with knowledge of a zoning restriction with the 
expectation of obtaining a change in zoning, which is then unfulfilled, 
has not suffered a taking, but that when land-use restrictions are 
implemented on a permit basis, "the land is purchased with future 
development legitimately anticipated and with no existing bar 
thereto."335 The court acknowledged that uses injurious to the public 
could have been barred.336 On the facts, however, the court found that 
the permit denial, which came after a lengthy and ultimately futile 
application process, constituted a taking.337 While the variance is not 
specifically addressed, the court's distinction between an expectation 
of rezoning and expectation of a permit approval is questionable. The 
expectation that accompanies a permit application is that the appli-
cant must satisfy certain conditions. Here, the landowner does not 
appear to have attempted to do so. Perhaps the decision may be 
explained by the difficulty of the application process and the unique 
facts of the case, coupled with a favorable political climate.338 
Even where state law imposes stringent requirements for granting 
zoning variances, and even though reviewing courts typically are not 
confined to the record in zoning variance cases,339 courts may defer to 
a local body's questionable variance decision. No less so than in the 
typical zoning context, unique local factors may drive the variance 
decision under an environmental regulation. This seems to have oc-
curred in Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, a recent case in which the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld a variance allowing a developer 
to fill a degraded wetland.340 In this case, the applicant obtained a 
variance from the terms of the city of Duluth's water resource ordi-
nance, which was incorporated into its zoning ordinance, and third-
334 Vatalaro, 601 So. 2d at 1229. The court ignored Florida precedent with respect to self-cre-
ated hardships. See, e.g., Thompson v. Planning Commission of Jacksonville, 464 So. 2d 1231, 
1237-'38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Elwyn v. Miami, 113 So. 2d 849, 852-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), 
em. denied, 116 So. 2d 773 (1959). 
335 Vatalaro, 601 So. 2d at 1229. 
336 [d. 
337 [d. 
338 The court found the facts favorable to the landowner. The property owner was "an elderly 
woman in declining health" who wanted to build a home for her daughter "because she needed 
someone nearby to look after her." [d. at 1225. The court chronicles at length the property 
owner's efforts to comply with local regulations. See id. In addition, the property rights move-
ment is active in the state of Florida. See supra note 278. 
339 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
340 474 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 483 N.W.2d 55 (1992). 
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party citizen groups challenged the variance.341 Minnesota law pro-
vides two different standards governing the grant of zoning vari-
ances. Under the state's local zoning enabling provisions, a landowner 
must show undue hardship.342 The statute codifies a three-part test 
and specifically denies the sufficiency of economic considerations for 
the grant of a variance.343 Counties and regional authorities operate 
under a slightly different standard, and may grant a variance on the 
basis of "practical difficulties or particular hardship."344 Again, a three-
part test is incorporated.345 But while the codification liberalizes the 
stringent Otto test, use variances are prohibited and economic consid-
erations are insufficient to justify a variance, provided there is a 
reasonable use for the property. The city ordinance, by contrast, 
incorporated a more lenient standard, allowing a variance "to the 
minimal extent necessary to give the applicant a reasonable use of 
said site and ... only upon a showing of hardship."346 
The court was especially deferential to the city in this case. Review-
ing the municipality's decision under a reasonableness standard, the 
appellate court declined to reverse the variance decision.347 The citi-
zens' groups argued that because the present owner's cement plant 
operation constituted a reasonable use of the property, the owner was 
not entitled to a variance. The appellate court labelled this argument 
"perverse," noting that the owner was discharging into the wetland.348 
Thus, the court appears to have treated the case more deferentially 
than a typical zoning variance.349 
341 See Krmpotich, 474 N.W.2d at 395-96; Telephone Interview with William P. Dinan, City 
Attorney, Duluth, Minn. (Oct. 28,1994) [hereinafter Dinan Interview]. 
342 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357(6) (West. 1991). 
343 [d. The statute empowers local boards of appeals to grant variances where "the property 
in question cannot be put to a reasonable use if used under conditions allowed by the official 
controls, the plight of the landowner is due to circumstances unique to the property not created 
by the landowner, and the variance, if granted, will not alter the essential character of the 
locality." [d. 
344 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.27(7) (West. Supp. 1994). 
345 See id. 
346 See id. This standard differs from the standard under the zoning enabling acts because it 
is contained in the city's zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance's hardship standard was 
grandfathered in when the state adopted its uniform planning act. Dinan interview, supra note 
340. 
347 Krmpotich, 474 N.W.2d at 396-97 
348 [d. 
343 The appellate court's cursory review of the variance decision and unusual deference to the 
local board is explainable by unique local factors such as the hardship standard; the degraded 
condition, current use, and small size of the wetland; and a pro-development local climate. Also 
enlightening is the fact that the court would ultimately find that the proposed development 
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4. Summary 
This review of cases in which courts have had to consider the 
propriety of the grant or denial of a variance or permit in cases 
involving modern land-use based environmental controls suggests 
that in typical circumstances, courts import the caselaw developed 
under traditional Euclidean zoning. Zoning caselaw in the form of 
stringent Otto-type tests often points directly to the denial of a vari-
ance from environmental land-use controls. Courts have sometimes 
distinguished between the underlying purposes of traditional zoning 
and modern environmental restrictions. But where environmental 
controls are implemented through local zoning ordinances, courts 
have tended to treat the requirements for a variance under the same 
standards and subject to the same body of caselaw that applies to 
traditional zoning variances. 
The cases also suggest, however, that blind application of zoning 
caselaw may not always be appropriate. The interests and values 
protected by environmental land-use controls may be more tangible 
than those that often support traditional zoning. Nonetheless, the 
zoning caselaw appears to have provided useful and appropriate guid-
ance for courts confronting various questions with regard to the vari-
ance decision. The caselaw thus can also serve as a guide and predictor 
to planners and resource managers. 
VI. THE VARIANCE AND LAND-USE BASED ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROLS 
Since at least Euclid, courts generally recognize that broad public 
purposes in safety, health, and welfare and the comprehensive nature 
of zoning justify zoning's rigid, and at times arbitrary, drawing of lines 
and segregation of uses.350 Courts have acquiesced despite the fact 
that many of the purported benefits of zoning are indirect while the 
costs that zoning imposes on individual landowners, and perhaps so-
ciety in the aggregate, may be substantial.351 Zoning has become a 
violated the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, a finding which was then overturned by the 
state supreme court. See Krmpotich, 483 N.W.2d. at 57. 
350 See supra notes 52-57, 233-49 and accompanying text. 
351 For a discussion of the failure of local zoning to achieve economic efficiency, see generally 
William C. Wheaton, supra note 238, in which the author argues that zoning fails to alleviate 
the problems that occur in the land market due to externalities. This is found to stem from 
zoning's political and parochial orientation and its failure to compensate restricted landowners. 
At the same time, any resultant increases in property values accrue, in the first instance, to the 
landowner. In short, zoning's private costs outweigh its public benefits. 
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nearly universal feature ofland-use planning in populated areas of the 
United States despite the fact that zoning places substantial limits on 
property owners' freedom to use and economically exploit their land. 
A zoning ordinance may require a residential landowner to leave most 
of a residential lot as open space. Seemingly innocuous uses may be 
barred. Similarly, a zoning ordinance may allow a commercial owner 
to operate one type of enterprise but not another, seemingly similar 
and unobjectionable, enterprise. Despite zoning's longstanding and 
widespread acceptance, the constitutional limits are always present 
in the background.352 Courts accordingly recognize that strict adher-
ence to the zoning scheme may have such a drastic financial or other 
impact on a landowner as to rise to the level of a taking, or constitute 
a denial of due process. 
Designed to provide a constitutional safety valve in the zoning 
context, the unnecessary hardship variance has a history of malleable 
and sometimes corrupt use by local reviewing bodies.353 Variances are 
often arbitrarily granted by local boards of appeal, undermining com-
prehensive planning efforts and other purposes of the ordinance. Yet 
when variance decisions are reviewed on appeal, courts scrutinize 
them closely in order to confine use of the variance to the unusual 
circumstance where denial would constitute a taking.354 The doctrinal 
devices that courts have developed attempt to preserve the integrity 
of the zoning scheme from piecemeal deterioration through unsup-
portable and inconsistent grants of variances. Accordingly, the show-
ing required to sustain the grant of a variance under Otto-like tests 
is generally strict.355 
Judicial review of the grant of zoning variances has consistently 
respected the comprehensive planning context zoning is supposed to 
serve. Such purposes as promotion of the public health, safety, and 
welfare through segregation of uses and setback and other perform-
ance criteria figure substantially in the decisions.356 Many courts also 
have allowed localities to enact land-use restrictions through zoning 
or otherwise, based on a municipality's desire to preserve such "soft" 
public interests as neighborhood character, orderliness, and uniform-
ity.357 
302 See supra § II, III. 
353 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
354 See supra section IV.B. 
3D5 [d. 
356 See supra section IV.B-D. passim. 
357 See supra section IV.D. 
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To the extent that courts have addressed the issue of whether to 
sustain or deny a variance in land-use based environmental controls, 
they have begun to incorporate the analysis developed during nearly 
a century's worth of zoning variance caselaw.358 This incorporation of 
the law of variances from the municipal zoning context is generally 
appropriate. There is a well-established and evolving body of caselaw 
that has addressed many of the policy issues that underlie land-use 
controls and the variety of factual and equitable circumstances that 
may arise under a land-use regulatory program. Courts need not 
re-invent the wheel, and thus may make use of this body oflaw where 
appropriate in developing an approach to environmental regulation 
and the regulatory takings issue.359 
There is, however, hazard in the careless importation of zoning 
doctrine. As the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested in 
Chirichello, environmental restrictions may have a greater claim to 
the public interest than traditional zoning.360 It may simply be incor-
rect, for example, that use variances pose a greater threat than area 
variances to the underlying purpose of an environmental restriction. 
Similarly, a court that allows a variation from a wetland setback 
ordinance-i.e., an area variance-because the variation will not 
change the "essential character" of a neighborhood fails to appreciate 
the fundamentally different nature of environmental regulations. In 
short, the caselaw concepts that have emerged may reflect zoning's 
traditional parochial focus and therefore may fail to coincide with the 
broader and more concrete concerns that underlie many land-use 
based environmental controls. 
Comparison to the traditional zoning hardship variance suggests 
that the standard for granting a variance under a broad-based envi-
ronmentalland-use restriction should be at least as stringent as that 
for the traditional zoning variance. Under the first Otto prong, courts 
should limit the grant of variances to those situations which would 
leave no reasonable use for the property and thus constitute a tak-
ing.361 Where, however, the statute vests an expert administrative 
agency with substantial discretion under a performance linked permit 
program,362 it may be appropriate for a court to show greater defer-
358 See supra section V.B. 
309 Cf. Klavens, supra note 273, at 339-40 (noting that courts, in adjudicating takings cases, 
engage in common-law reasoning, which requires delicate balancing of interests). 
360 See supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text. 
361 See supra section IV.B. 
362 See supra text accompanying note 261. 
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ence to the variance decision. The Otto unique burden requirement363 
is also appropriate in order to ensure that variances are not granted 
unless a burden is unfairly borne. Land-use based environmental 
controls are designed to prevent direct injury to the protected re-
source. Thus, as suggested by the third prong of the Otto inquiry,364 a 
number of courts have recognized not simply the individual financial 
harm to the property owner but the public risk and harm to the 
resource and ecosystem that the regulatory program is intended to 
protect.365 As courts have recognized, where the effects of non-com-
pliance can readily be shown to constitute a direct harm to public 
resources, such scrutiny is highly appropriate.366 Adherence to an Otto 
type of test will help vindicate the broad underlying public interests 
behind properly enacted environmental land-use controls. 
In addition to the Otto analysis, other doctrines employed in the 
zoning cases can play a role in assuring that variances are granted 
where appropriate. The self-created hardship is such a doctrine.367 
Courts may employ this doctrine to prevent intentional landowner 
manipulation of parcel lines in order to conceptually sever property 
and claim that the diminution in value or prevention of use resulting 
from a land-use restriction is extreme. The clearest example is the 
landowner who knowingly divides a parcel near a protected resource 
so as to create a parcel that is all or mostly within the setback area, 
and then claims no use is possible without a variance.368 As in the 
zoning context, self-created hardship rules should prevent a variance 
from issuing in such cases. 
Zoning variance caselaw does not insulate environmental protec-
tion measures from scrutiny. Land-use restrictions must, of course, 
conform to other applicable state and federal law. Legislators and 
regulators must be mindful of the proper objects of land-use regula-
tion and must be sure that there is a sufficiently close connection 
between the goals of a regulatory program and the specific land-use 
restrictions employed to achieve them. 
Nonetheless, the zoning experience does provide a lens through 
which we may assess the impact of modern environmental land-use 
controls. Courts should be encouraged to recognize the differences 
363 See supra notes 200--04 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra notes 178--99 and accompanying text. 
365 See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text. 
866 See supra notes 289--317 and accompanying text. 
867 See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text. 
368 The landowner in Perrin v. Thwn of Kittery, see supra notes 323--31 and accompanying 
text, may have attempted such a result. See 591 A.2d 861 (Me. 1991). 
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between traditional zoning and the purposes underlying land-use 
based environmental controls. So far, there have been only sugges-
tions by some courts that a different calculus may be required when 
considering whether to allow an exception from a use restriction in, 
for example, a built-up commercial area, or an undeveloped river 
corridor. Advocates for landowners and regulators should encourage 
courts to recognize the similarities-and the differences-between 
traditional zoning and modern environmental land-use controls. Such 
recognition, by making explicit the broad public interest in the pres-
ervation of a healthy environment, will help vindicate and strengthen 
those land-use restrictions that are necessary to protect such vital 
features as wetlands and other sensitive areas. We may also gain a 
better appreciation for the basic legitimacy of both types of restric-
tions. At the same time, the zoning experience can help us to see when 
a restriction may go too far, by unfairly forcing a small number of 
landowners to bear a unique burden that should be borne by all. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For better or worse, zoning has become a nearly universal feature 
of land-use regulation in the United States. While the citizens of 
Houston remain free, much of the country has long accepted that 
restrictions on what we may do with our property provide benefits to 
all of us sufficient to warrant the imposition. Even Justice Scalia 
recognizes the validity of resource protection and zoning restric-
tions.369 Modern land-use regulation has developed techniques to pro-
vide needed flexibility so as to properly protect and preserve vital 
natural resources without unduly and unnecessarily imposing bur-
dens. Yet it is equally clear that a regulation can go too far. It is 
against the background of such a possibility that the zoning variance 
and much of the caselaw of zoning developed. Environmental controls 
serve fundamentally different, and often broader, purposes than tra-
ditional zoning regulations. In most circumstances, courts can apply 
zoning variance caselaw where variances from land-use based envi-
ronmental controls are at issue. To the extent that the application 
does not undermine the intent and purpose of the regulation, impor-
tation of other aspects of the caselaw is not only useful, but appropriate. 
369 See supra note 206. 
